Strategic behavior patterns of small multi-institutional health organizations.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to R D Luke.
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This study has attempted to determine the relationship between physician domain of practice and their quality of medical care. The study examined whether there was a quality difference in practice either 1) between general practitioners and specialists, or 2) between specialists practicing within and outside their specialty domains. The sample consisted of 454 physicians of Hawaii, involving 18 specialty categories: general practitioners (133) and specialists (321). The study finds that when the general practitioners in this study practices without limitation, their quality of care was not as good as that of the specialists. The study also found that when the specialists practiced outside their specialty areas, the relative quality of their performance declined. The latter finding was sustained even when other important practice and background variables were held constant. The study also discusses its generalizability and policy implications.
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This study examined the effect of group affiliation on the use of technical (length of stay, lab tests, etc.) and clinical (rendering and requesting consultations) resources by physicians practicing within a large acute care hospital. Comparisons in use were made between physicians in 1) a prepaid group practice (Colorado Permanente Medical Group [Kaiser]); 2) a fee-for-service group practice; and 3) "unaffiliated" physicians. Patient data were adjusted whenever possible for patient diagnosis and severity. In comparison to other physicians in the hospital, the prepaid group physicians utilized somewhat fewer technical resources, though the results were not statistically significant. Differences in the use of clinical resources were statistically significant, with the fee-for-service group physicians using consulting services the most and prepaid group physicians using them the least. The results indicate that 1) fee-for-service group structures may reinforce the incentives to share in consultation revenues; 2) prepaid group physicians may experience difficulty becoming integrated into the informal structures of physician practice patterns; and 3) the control of groups over the use of technical hospital resources may be substantially weakened when groups do not own or control the hospitals to which they admit their patients.
The study has attempted to determine how client/colleague dependence influences medical care received by patients. We have tested physician compliance with standards of care according to the degree to which the practice is visible to, and dependent upon, colleagues. Physician performance is measured in terms of compliance with established professional standards in five areas of practice: 1) the quality of medical care; 2) appropriateness of hospital admissions; 3) appropriateness of length of hospital stay; 2) overstays and 5) understays. The sample consisted of 3316 hospital episodes from 22 general hospitals in the state of Hawaii, and the analysis was conducted via multiple-classification analysis (MCA). Specifically, it was found that from the more colleague-dependent physicians, patients received care with: 1) higher scores on an index of quality of care; 2) more justified admissions; 3) more appropriate lengths of stay; 4) fewer overstays; but 5) more understays. These results remained even after adjusting for a number of physician, client and type-of-practice variables. The findings of this study suggest the significant role that the informal structure of physician practice plays in influencing physician performance. Various sociological implications for control of professional practice are discussed in terms of 1) provision of incentives to encourage an increase in the formalization of otherwise informal physician relationships, and 2) tying formal control mechanisms to informal processes of control.
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Acute care hospitals have increasingly been forming local strategic hospital alliances (SHAs), which consume considerable resources in forming and may affect the competitiveness of provider markets. This research shows that SHAs and market factors, which have been perceived to be threats to hospitals, are related to hospitals' financial performance. Among the findings are that SHA members have higher net revenues but that they are not more effective at cost control. Nor do the higher net revenues result in higher cash flow. However, increasing SHA penetration in a market is related to lower net revenues per case. In addition, the penetration of private health maintenance organizations in markets is associated with lower revenues and expenses.
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Group practice administrators are understandably concerned about the drawbacks and the benefits of formal affiliation of their groups with hospitals or other healthcare institutions. An administrator may wonder: "Should we align ourselves with this particular institution at this time?" or "What kinds of formal arrangements should we enter into?" A good administrator is also a good negotiator, and as such, will try to consider and include the opinions of the other participants in actions involving his group. When considering affiliation with an organization, the administrator will try to understand the drawbacks and the benefits as seen from the other side of the fence.