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Biomedical subjects

R Fock

Publications and source records attributed to R Fock.

10 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2005

[Management of bioterroristic attacks with dangerous infectious agents].

The ongoing discussion on threats by terrorist attacks leads to a realignment of tasks and responsibilities within the health care system. Especially the public health services are developing from exercising mainly an advisory function to becoming an integral part in disaster response to devastating biological scenarios. Recent risk assessment recommends authoritative integration of public health officials into disaster response planning and to define their role inside the command and control structures of disaster management. Interdisciplinary networks of public health services, medical treatment centres, emergency medical services, reference laboratories and hospital hygiene services have appeared to be successful in the management of life-threatening, contagious diseases and unexpected bioterrorist incidents as well. In March 2003 the "StAKoB" was established as a permanent working group of the centres for prepared ness and treatment. Major objectives of the working group are ex change of information, mutual support in cases of emergency and standardisation in staff training.

Biological Warfare↗
PubMed2002

Conceptional considerations for a German influenza pandemic preparedness plan.

A pandemic appearance of influenza A virus must be expected at any time. The limitations of health preserving and life-saving resources, which will inevitably be reached in the event of a pandemic, will be accompanied by ethical and possibly social conflicts, which can be lessened or resolved only through precautionary planning, clearly specified competencies and transparent decisions within a social consensus. In case of a shortage of vaccines and virostatic agents, decisions will have to be made with regard to the segment of the population that absolutely must be vaccinated. It is currently estimated that a (monovalent) vaccine developed for a new pandemic strain would only suffice for the single vaccination of approximately half of the German population after a year; only 10-14 million vaccine dosages would be available to provide basic immunization and single boosters to personnel required to maintain basic medical care and essential infrastructure after half a year. In the event of local influenza outbreaks, antiviral chemotherapeutic agents could be used to close the gap until a vaccine can become effective. Even if suitable influenza vaccines and virostatic agents are not sufficiently available at the start of a pandemic, it is still possible to at least prevent an outbreak of two of the most feared secondary infections that accompany influenza: pneumococcal pneumonia or meningitis and illnesses resulting from Haemophilus influenzae. Agreement still needs to be reached with manufacturers for guaranteeing the necessary vaccine production or ensuring that they have a sufficient stock to meet the minimum demand for antiviral agents and agents for symptomatic treatment.

Antiviral Agents↗
PubMed2002

Influenza pandemic: preparedness planning in Germany.

The following conceptual framework formed the basis for a common decision made by the health ministers of Germany's 16 federal states to set up an influenza pandemic preparedness plan. The worst case scenario was used, on the basis of the data from the pandemic of 'Spanish flu', in 1918-20. The priority groups for vaccination were assessed, as well as the potentially available antiviral treatments. National policies could be highly improved by a common European view.

Disease Outbreaks↗
PubMed2002

Management of patients in Germany with suspected viral haemorrhagic fever and other potentially lethal contagious infections.

Patients suffering from viral haemorrhagic fevers must be handled specifically. The clinical diagnosis of these diseases in the initial stage is difficult because early symptoms are non specific. In Germany, specific diagnosis is available at two diagnostic centres with biosafety level 4 facilities. Five high security infectious disease isolation units for patient care are available in Munich, Leipzig, Hamburg, Berlin, and Frankfurt. In addition, a corresponding number of centres of competence are established to offer support and advice to the hospitals initially treating the patients and to the local public health officers. The decentralisation of these centres of competence is recommended to allow for more timely and reactive responses to VHF epidemic threats. The risk categorisation for contacts has proved to be very useful in practice.

Animals↗
PubMed2001

[Skelefon framework concept for defence against risks in unusual epidemics: steps by public health offices].

Necessary anti-epidemic measures have to be promulgated or taken immediately in case of a suspected case of pneumonic plague or a viral haemorrhagic fever which can be transmitted from human to human. A live threatening highly contagious infectious disease may occur at any place in Germany. Therefore each health office should have the relevant information on the available infrastructure in Germany concerning treatment and competence centres, diagnostic laboratories, dispatch of samples and patient transportation. They should also be able to give qualified recommendations to physicians and hospitals concerning the necessary measures in such a case. Contacts at risk have to be notified. Based on a risk assessment and the special living conditions of the contact person they should decide if and which further measures have to be initiated, especially in the case of post-exposure prophylaxis, separation and prohibition of work. In general, imported cases of dangerous infectious diseases quickly find the interest of the media, including all the implications resulting from this. A well-organized cooperation with the media and public relations helps to avoid unnecessary irritations and panic.

Communicable Disease Control↗
PubMed1986

[Bone concentrations of imipenem after a dose of imipenem/cilastatin].

The concentration of imipenem in organic bone, determined in 16 patients by bioassay after short infusion (15 min) of 1 g imipenem/cilastatin was 4.3 +/- 2.06 mg/kg (geometric mean +/- standard deviation, n = 13) after 45 minutes, and 2.8 +/- 1.86 mg/kg (n = 26) after 88 minutes. Imipenem penetrates into inorganic hydroxylapatite (imbution), however, its antimicrobial activity is lost. The mean serum concentration in 12 patients (mean age 77 years) with normal renal and hepatic function 15 minutes after the beginning of the infusion was 93.1 mg/l imipenem. The mean serum half life t (1/2 beta) was 1.32 hours, the total body clearance 108.6 1/h, and the volume of distribution during the beta phase V(beta) 12.4 1.

Aged↗
PubMed1981

Origin of Haemophilus influenzae R factors.

The Haemophilus influenzae R plasmids specifying resistance against one, two, or three antibiotics which have emerged in different parts of the world were shown to have closely related but not identical plasmid cores. The gene for ampicillin resistance in the H. influenzae plasmid pKRE5367 is part of a transposon similar to Tn3, which was transposed from pKRE5367 onto RSF1010 in Escherichia coli. An indigenous H. influenzae plasmid (pW266) was isolated. Its properties correspond to those of the H. influenzae R plasmids, except for the presence of a drug resistance transposon. The in vitro-generated H. influenzae R plasmids carrying an ampicillin resistance transposon, a tetracycline resistance transposon, and a transposon for combined tetracycline-chloramphenicol resistance resembled the natural isolates. The findings support the hypothesis that the R plasmids of H. influenzae are of multiclonal evolutionary origin.

Ampicillin↗