Health insurance and health access. Reengineering local safety nets.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to R R Bovbjerg.
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OBJECTIVE: To describe the contributions of nonprofit hospitals and health plans to healthcare markets and to analyze state policy options with regard to the conversion of nonprofits to for-profit status. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: Secondary national and state data from a variety of sources, 1980-present. STUDY DESIGN: Policy analysis. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: Development of a conceptual economic framework; analysis of empirical, legal, and theoretical literature; and review of statutes, rules, and court decisions. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Three main rationales support special status for nonprofits, especially hospitals: charity care, other community benefits, and consumer protection. The main social rationale for for-profits is their incentives for better efficiency. There are reasons to expect that nonprofit and for-profit goals differ; however, measured differences in community hospital cost, prices, and quality between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals are undetectable or inconclusive. Nonprofit hospitals do provide more uncompensated care than for-profit hospitals. Similarities between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals may exist because nonprofits may set norms that for-profits follow to some degree. States have substantial power and discretion in overseeing nonprofit conversions. Some have regularized oversight through new legislation that constrains, but does not eliminate, state officials' discretion. These statutes may be deferential to converting entities and their buyers or may be very restrictive of them. CONCLUSIONS: Overseeing the appropriate disposition of nonprofit assets in individual conversions is extremely important. States should also monitor local market conditions through community benefits assessments and other data collection, however, to accurately assess (and possibly redress) what is lost or gained from conversion. Local market conditions are likely more important in determining hospital behavior than ownership form. Potentially, a mix of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals in a given market may improve market performance due to constraints the two ownership types may exercise over one another. If nonprofits disappear, the states may need to maintain quality and access norms through regulation.
As managed care has spread, so has legislation to force plans to contract with any willing provider (AWP) and give patients freedom of choice (FOC). Managed care organizations' selective networks and provider integration reduce patient access to providers, along with provider access to paying patients, so many providers have lobbied for AWP-FOC laws. In opposition are managed care organizations (MCOs), which want full freedom to contract selectively to control prices and utilization. This article comprehensively describes laws in all fifty-one jurisdictions, classifies their relative strength, and assesses the implications of the laws. Most are relatively weak forms and all are limited in application by ERISA and the federal HMO Act. The article also uses an associative multivariate analysis to relate the selective contracting environments to HMO penetration rates, rural population, physician density, and other variables. States with weak laws also have higher HMO penetration and higher physician density, but smaller rural populations. We conclude that the strongest laws overly restrict the management of care, to the likely detriment of cost control. But where market power is rapidly concentrating, not restricting selective contracting could diminish long-term competition and patient access to care. In the face of uncertainty about the impact of these laws, an intermediate approach may be better than all or nothing. States should consider mandating that plans offer point-of-service options, for a separate premium. This option expands patient choice of plans at the time of enrollment and of providers at the time of care, yet maintains plans' ability to control core providers.
Quantitative analysis of medical liability's influence on medical practice is a small but growing field. The three foregoing articles illustrate three of the possible analytic approaches: case study of technological diffusion, survey of physician responses to detailed clinical scenarios, and multivariate analysis of the relation of physicians' scenario responses to objective liability experience. The articles also offer a good picture of the state of the art: Many difficulties hamper research in this area, and these articles, like others, offer considerable illumination but leave much uncovered. Defensive medicine surely exists, but its effects on health care spending and access are unclear. The most important lessons for public policy are that tort reform may be necessary but not sufficient to reduce the problems associated with defensive medicine, and that the major malpractice problem continues to be malpractice.
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OBJECTIVE: To investigate whether an association exists between physicians' past and subsequent claims of medical malpractice, particularly whether a history of even unpaid claims ($0) or small claims (< $30,000) predicts subsequently higher rates of claims, especially large paid claims (> or = $30,000) (all in 1990 dollars). DATA: All medical malpractice claims closed in the state of Florida from January 1975 through August 1988 (N = 20,016, 92% involving physicians), matched with the American Medical Association's Physician Masterfile on all practicing physicians in the state of Florida during that period. Claims history was automated into physician-year claims files, then partitioned into a baseline period (1975 through 1980) and a subsequent period (1981 through 1983). Inconsequential claims were excluded, ie, cases closed without a named claimant and without expense for investigation (30.4% of raw claims). METHODS: Descriptive analysis of all physician claims; odds ratio analysis of physicians in practice throughout both periods (N = 8247), comparing claims experience in baseline vs subsequent period, adjusted for specialty of practice. RESULTS: For all consequential physician claims, 60% were unpaid claims, 17% were small paid claims, and 23% were large paid claims. The 8247 continuously practicing physicians had a total of 6614 claims, averaging 0.9 per year, but 59.2% of physicians had no claims in 9 years, only 13.4% had any paid claims, and 7.2% had multiple paid claims. Less than 8% of physicians had any large paid claims during the baseline period, and less than 7% had any in the subsequent period. Physicians with any baseline claims (whether paid or unpaid, small or large, single or multiple) had elevated odds of subsequent claims (whether defined as any claims, any paid claims, any large claims, or multiple claims) relative to physicians with no baseline claims. With a baseline of all small claims, the adjusted odds ratio for any subsequent claim was 2.84 (95% confidence interval [CI], 2.32 to 3.49), for any subsequent paid claim was 2.97 (95% CI, 2.34 to 3.77), for all large subsequent claims was 2.42 (95% CI, 1.76 to 3.33), and for subsequent multiple claims was 2.83 (95% CI, 2.08 to 3.86). Even having a single unpaid baseline claim approximately doubled the odds. CONCLUSIONS: Claims history had predictive value, even with only unpaid claims. Small paid claims were better predictors than unpaid claims, large paid claims were better predictors than small paid claims, and multiple paid claims were better predictors than single paid claims. Claims history of all kinds is a reasonable statistical measure, eg, for the screening purposes of the National Practitioner Data Bank.
Once epidemic, tuberculosis has re-emerged, often in newly drug-resistant forms. This public health threat calls for strong public action as well as improved private care. Action has been hampered by failures in public health infrastructure and legal-philosophical support for government intervention. Josephine Gittler's accompanying article usefully suggests rebuilding public-health agencies and adapting traditional authority and controls from the age of epidemics to take account of today's circumstances and sensibilities.
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Accelerated-compensation events (ACEs) are classes of avoidable medical injuries. Originally, these classes were used in tort reform to speed payment for avoidable injuries. However, ACEs also have potential as tools to monitor and improve the quality of health care. ACEs are developed by physicians, based on medical decision making. Rather than simply identify an adverse outcome, they link that outcome to clinical processes. Therefore, ACEs can help identify the critical elements of care that would result in desirable outcomes. Also, ACEs are discerning: they identify only events of which the vast majority are preventable. In one project, ACEs have been developed for obstetrics/gynecology, general surgery, and orthopedic surgery, using a three-phase process of sifting data and honing definitions. Future plans include improving these ACEs, statistically evaluating them, and testing them for utility in quality monitoring and improvement.
Today's unduly erratic and expensive payment system for medical malpractice undercuts its own goal of compensating victims. Its lack of scientific legitimacy hampers its other main goal of deterring injury. Reform is needed, but most "tort reform" fails to make fundamental changes and does not promote quality of care. Alternative systems using "Accelerated Compensation Events" (ACEs) offer a better way to replace or improve judicial resolution of liability claims as well as independent, quality-oriented reform. ACEs do not cover all injuries, just classes of adverse outcomes that are normally avoidable, given good care. This article explains the scientific methodology of ACE development and the benefits of ACE-based reforms.
Reinsurance is one way that insurance companies pool risk, in this case, across insurance companies. Under conventional private practice, primary health insurers, including self-insured groups and HMOs, voluntarily contract with reinsurers to share some risk and some premiums. Because the primary carrier mainly wants to protect its solvency against unpredictable variation in claims experience, it normally reinsures only the "high end" of claims risk. This retrospective coverage of unusually high losses helps primary insurers take on more risk than they otherwise could. But it does not help secure affordable coverage for people with prospectively known high risks. Some plans for reforming private health insurance also invoke reinsurance-like mechanisms, especially in the markets for individual and small group coverage. There, reinsurance serves as part of a strategy for requiring that primary insurance be made available to all applicants, regardless of risk. Reinsurance or similar rules for allocating the burden of unusually high risks can help keep any one private insurer from having to bear a disproportionate share of high risks, and thus extend the reach of private insurance markets through regulation. But reinsurance alone does not reduce the underlying high cost of providing such primary coverage. Nor can reinsurance alone provide the resources to cover the uninsured, ensure that insurers will want to cover them, or make them voluntarily buy private coverage. Only some combination of new subsidies and mandates can do that.
Most malpractice litigation in obstetrics could be replaced with an alternative insurance system based on "accelerated-compensation events," which are classes of medical injuries determined in advance by medical experts to be readily identifiable, normally preventable with good care, and nondistorting of medical decision making. This professionally derived system would help prevent injury and improve the resolution of injuries. Prior work on accelerated-compensation events was largely conceptual, so to study the likely effects of accelerated-compensation events, we applied the events to a large database of obstetrical malpractice claims. Results refute prior criticisms. Accelerated-compensation events (1) are definitely feasible to develop and apply, (2) would probably cover two thirds of currently paid claims and three quarters of indemnity dollars, (3) would likely involve substantial savings in time and expense per case, and (4) would probably not introduce an unmanageable number of large new claims.
Decrease in the average duration of hemodialysis treatment time is a continuing phenomenon. We investigated the relationship of 3-year mortality to duration of dialysis in a 1984-1985 national random sample of 600 hemodialysis patients from 36 dialysis units. Mortality was negatively associated with duration of dialysis treatments, as shown by the Cox model, adjusted for other patient and dialysis unit covariates. With adjustment for other covariates, patients receiving an average dialysis treatment duration of less than 3.5 hours had relative mortality risks of 1.17 to 2.18 compared with those with treatments longer than 3.5 hours (mortality risk of 1.0). Reverse causation (the possibility that more seriously ill patients received dialysis for a shorter time) appears unlikely. We conclude that duration of the dialysis procedure is an important element in determining patient mortality as one of the factors determining the adequacy of dialysis.
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The states of Washington, Alaska, Montana, and Idaho (WAMI) have all had declines in the proportion of physicians offering obstetric services during the past few years, a decline precipitated by rising medical malpractice premiums. One response to the problem of rising liability premiums has been the passage of extensive tort reform legislation. We present the results of recent studies of physicians' obstetric practices in the WAMI states and summarize the major changes in tort legislation and regulation that have occurred in these states. Most general and family physicians in the WAMI region no longer provide obstetric care; by contrast, more than 80% of the obstetrician-gynecologists in the WAMI states are still practicing obstetrics. Despite the fact that only a minority of family physicians are still active in obstetrics, most rural family physicians in all four states still deliver babies. Most physicians in all four states limit the amount of care they provide to those covered by Medicaid, which suggests that significant barriers to care exist for medically indigent persons. All four states have adopted significant tort reforms. Despite these changes in the legal environment, the cost of malpractice premiums and concerns over the likelihood of being sued continue to limit the number of physicians willing to provide obstetric care. Although it cannot be inferred from these data that tort reform has decreased the rate at which physicians give up obstetric practice, the evidence is compatible with such a conclusion.