H5N1 influenza--continuing evolution and spread.
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Animals↗
Biomedical subjects
Robert G Webster
Publications and source records attributed to Robert G Webster.
Continuing evolution of H9 influenza viruses in Korean poultry.
We analyzed the evolution of H9 influenza viruses isolated from Korean chicken farms from 2002 to 2004. Korean H9 viruses formed two antigenically distinct groups: those isolated from 1996 to mid-2003, and those isolated from late 2003 through 2004. Most of the 2004 isolates showed greater cross-reactivity with the second group than with the first group. Phylogenetic analysis of the 12 viruses studied revealed three genotypes of H9N2 viruses and showed that reassortment had occurred. One isolate, Ck/Kor/164/04, belonged to the H9N8 subtype. Its HA and PB1 genes were similar to those of the H9N2 viruses, but its other genes were closely related to H3N8 viruses. This report is the first (to our knowledge) of H9N8 infection in this host. The pathogenicity of the early isolates altered due to antigenic drift and reassortment, leading to H9 avian influenza viruses in Korea that potentially can expand their host range to mammalians.
Animals↗
Cross-protectiveness and immunogenicity of influenza A/Duck/Singapore/3/97(H5) vaccines against infection with A/Vietnam/1203/04(H5N1) virus in ferrets.
Ferrets were immunized with two 7- mu g doses of hemagglutinin from inactivated whole-virus vaccines containing the hemagglutinin gene of A/Duck/Singapore/3/97(H5N3) then inoculated with a lethal dose of A/Vietnam/1203/04(H5N1) (Viet/1203/04). Serum samples did not react with Viet/1203/04 in hemagglutination-inhibition (HI) or virus-neutralization (VN) tests. All vaccinated ferrets survived the challenge, whereas all mock-immunized ferrets died. Immunized ferrets had significantly lower virus titers in the upper respiratory tract and less-severe disease. Vaccine generated from antigenically different H5 virus protects against infection by a highly pathogenic H5 strain. Neither HI nor VN testing provides correlates of cross-protection in ferrets.
Animals↗
Immunization with reverse-genetics-produced H5N1 influenza vaccine protects ferrets against homologous and heterologous challenge.
BACKGROUND: Multiple cases of transmission of avian H5N1 influenza viruses to humans illustrate the urgent need for an efficacious, cross-protective vaccine. METHODS: Ferrets were immunized with inactivated whole-virus vaccine produced by reverse genetics with the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase genes of A/HK/213/03 virus. Ferrets received a single dose of vaccine (7 or 15 microg of HA) with aluminum hydroxide adjuvant or 2 doses (7 microg of HA each) without adjuvant and were challenged with 10(6) 50% egg infectious doses of A/HK/213/03, A/HK/156/97, or A/Vietnam/1203/04 virus. RESULTS: One or 2 doses of vaccine induced a protective antibody response to the vaccine strain. All immunization regimens completely protected ferrets from challenge with homologous wild-type A/HK/213/03 virus: no clinical signs of infection were observed, virus replication was significantly reduced (P<.05) and was restricted to the upper respiratory tract, and spread of virus to the brain was prevented. Importantly, all vaccinated ferrets were protected against lethal challenge with the highly pathogenic strain A/Vietnam/1203/04. The 2-dose schedule induced higher levels of antibodies that were cross-reactive to antigenically distinct H5N1 viruses. CONCLUSIONS: H5N1 vaccines may stimulate an immune response that is more cross-protective than what might be predicted by in vitro assays and, thus, hold potential for being stockpiled as "initial" pandemic vaccines.
Animals↗
The immunogenicity and efficacy against H5N1 challenge of reverse genetics-derived H5N3 influenza vaccine in ducks and chickens.
H5N1 avian influenza viruses are continuing to spread in waterfowl in Eurasia and to threaten the health of avian and mammalian species. The possibility that highly pathogenic (HP) H5N1 avian influenza is now endemic in both domestic and migratory birds in Eurasia makes it unlikely that culling alone will control H5N1 influenza. Because ducks are not uniformly killed by HP H5N1 viruses, they are considered a major contributor to virus spread. Here, we describe a reverse genetics-derived high-growth H5N3 strain containing the modified H5 of A/chicken/Vietnam/C58/04, the N3 of A/duck/Germany/1215/73, and the internal genes of A/PR/8/34. One or two doses of inactivated oil emulsion vaccine containing 0.015 to 1.2 microg of HA protein provide highly efficacious protection against lethal H5N1 challenge in ducks; only the two dose regimen has so far been tested in chickens with high protective efficacy.
Animals↗
Distribution of amantadine-resistant H5N1 avian influenza variants in Asia.
We examined the distribution of genetic mutations associated with resistance to the M2 ion channel-blocking adamantane derivatives, amantadine and rimantadine, among H5N1 viruses isolated in Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and China. More than 95% of the viruses isolated in Vietnam and Thailand contained resistance mutations, but resistant mutants were less commonly isolated in Indonesia (6.3% of isolates) and China (8.9% of isolates), where human infection was recently reported. The dual mutation motif Leu26Ile-Ser31Asn (leucine-->isoleucine at aa 26 and serine-->asparagine at aa 31) was found almost exclusively in all resistant isolates from Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia, suggesting the biological selection of these mutations.
Amantadine↗
Molecular changes associated with adaptation of human influenza A virus in embryonated chicken eggs.
Failure to isolate A/Fujian/411/2002 (H3N2) in embryonated chicken eggs resulted in its absence from the 2003/2004 vaccine. We analyzed the adaptation of this virus in eggs during serial passages in the amniotic then allantoic cavities. Amniotic passage allowed the virus to grow in the allantoic cavity. During adaptation, 6 amino acid substitutions occurred: 4 in HA (G186V, S219F, V226I, V309I) and 2 in NA (E119Q, Q136K). These substitutions allowed binding to SAalpha2,3Gal- and SAalpha2,6Gal-containing receptors, conferred SAalpha2,3Gal specificity, and preserved antigenicity. Two HA substitutions (G186V, V226I) were sufficient to improve growth. Changing 2 NA residues (E119Q, Q136K) did not improve growth, and adaptation did not result in the HA changes H183L, D188Y, and V226A found by others. These findings suggest that viral adaptation in eggs involves multiple strategies. Vaccine manufacture will benefit from increased understanding of adaptation and strategies to improve human influenza A virus replication in eggs.
Adaptation, Physiological↗
The polymerase complex genes contribute to the high virulence of the human H5N1 influenza virus isolate A/Vietnam/1203/04.
H5N1 influenza viruses transmitted from poultry to humans in Asia cause high mortality and pose a pandemic threat. Viral genes important for cell tropism and replication efficiency must be identified to elucidate and target virulence factors. We applied reverse genetics to generate H5N1 reassortants combining genes of lethal A/Vietnam/1203/04 (VN1203), a fatal human case isolate, and nonlethal A/chicken/Vietnam/C58/04 (CH58) and tested their pathogenicity in ferrets and mice. The viruses' hemagglutinins have six amino acids differences, identical cleavage sites, and avian-like alpha-(2,3)-linked receptor specificity. Surprisingly, exchanging hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes did not alter pathogenicity, but substituting CH58 polymerase genes completely attenuated VN1203 virulence and reduced viral polymerase activity. CH58's NS gene partially attenuated VN1203 in ferrets but not in mice. Our findings suggest that for high virulence in mammalian species an avian H5N1 virus with a cleavable hemagglutinin requires adaptive changes in polymerase genes to overcome the species barrier. Thus, novel antivirals targeting polymerase proteins should be developed.
Animals↗
Combination chemotherapy, a potential strategy for reducing the emergence of drug-resistant influenza A variants.
Rapid development of resistant influenza variants after amantadine treatment is one of the main drawbacks of M2 blockers. On the other hand, the emergence of variants with low susceptibility to the neuraminidase (NA) inhibitors is limited. In the present study we examined whether combination therapy with two classes of anti-influenza drugs can affect the emergence of resistant variants in vitro. We observed that virus yields of human A/Nanchang/1/99 (H1N1), A/Panama/2007/99 (H3N2), and A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5N1) viruses in MDCK cells were significantly reduced (P<0.005) when the cells were treated with the combination of amantadine and low doses of oseltamivir carboxylate (< or =1microM). After five sequential passages in MDCK cells, the M2 protein of viruses cultivated with amantadine alone mutated at positions V27A and S31N/I. Viruses cultivated with oseltamivir carboxylate (> or =0.001microM) possessed mutations in the hemagglutinin (HA) protein. These variants showed reduced efficiency of binding to sialic acid receptors and decreased sensitivity to NA inhibitor in plaque reduction assay. Importantly, no mutations in the HA, NA, and M2 proteins were detected when the drugs were used in combination. Our results suggest that combination chemotherapy with M2 blocker and NA inhibitor reduced the emergence of drug-resistant influenza variants in vitro. This strategy could be an option for the control of influenza virus infection, and combinations with other novel drugs should be explored.
Acetamides↗
Large-scale sequence analysis of avian influenza isolates.
The spread of H5N1 avian influenza viruses (AIVs) from China to Europe has raised global concern about their potential to infect humans and cause a pandemic. In spite of their substantial threat to human health, remarkably little AIV whole-genome information is available. We report here a preliminary analysis of the first large-scale sequencing of AIVs, including 2196 AIV genes and 169 complete genomes. We combine this new information with public AIV data to identify new gene alleles, persistent genotypes, compensatory mutations, and a potential virulence determinant.
Animals↗
Gangliosides are not essential for influenza virus infection.
Sialic acid is known to be an essential part of influenza virus receptors, but the specific identity of the receptor molecules on target cells is still not defined. In particular, the relative roles played by cellular sialylglycoproteins and gangliosides in virus entry into target cells remain unclear. To test whether gangliosides are essential for virus infection, we used the GM-95 mutant cell line of mouse B16 melanoma which lacks synthesis of major glycosphingolipids including gangliosides. We found that GM-95 cells grown in serum-containing medium harboured substantial amounts of ganglioside receptors for influenza virus due to incorporation of serum gangliosides. To obtain ganglioside-free cells, we adapted GM-95 cells to growth in defined serum-free (sf) medium. Ganglioside-free GM-95-sf cells could be infected by avian and human influenza A viruses and produced infectious virus progeny demonstrating that gangliosides were neither absolutely necessary for the early nor for the late stages of the infection. However, sensitivity of the GM-95-sf cells to the viruses was 2-4 times lower than that of the ganglioside-containing parent cell line. Further studies are needed to specify whether this effect was due to the lack of gangliosides, neutral glycosphingolipids, or other effects.
Animals↗
Characterization of an avian influenza virus of subtype H7N2 isolated from chickens in northern China.
An H7N2 avian influenza virus was isolated from chickens during routine surveillance in northern China in 2002. To understand the origin of this virus, we completely sequenced its genome. The PB1, PA, HA, and M genes of this virus were highly homologous with those of the wild bird virus A/Africa starling/Eng-Q/983/79 (H7N1). The NP and NS genes were closely related to those of two other wild bird viruses isolated 30 years ago. The closest relatives of the PB2 and NA genes of the virus were those of the A/swine/Germany/2/81 (H1NI) and A/Leningrad/134/57 (H2N2), respectively. Animal inoculation tests showed that the virus cannot replicate efficiently in chickens. However, after intranasal inoculation, the virus induced 20% weight loss and replicated well in the lungs of mice. The virus was also recovered from the hearts and brains of the mice. These results suggest that the influenza virus isolated in chickens in northern China in 2002 originated in wild birds and may pose a threat for both avian species and mammalian hosts.
Animals↗
Detection of influenza viruses resistant to neuraminidase inhibitors in global surveillance during the first 3 years of their use.
Emergence of influenza viruses with reduced susceptibility to neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs) develops at a low level following drug treatment, and person-to-person transmission of resistant virus has not been recognized to date. The Neuraminidase Inhibitor Susceptibility Network (NISN) was established to follow susceptibility of isolates and occurrence of NAI resistance at a population level in various parts of the world. Isolates from the WHO influenza collaborating centers were screened for susceptibilities to oseltamivir and zanamivir by a chemiluminescent enzyme inhibition assay, and those considered potentially resistant were analyzed by sequence analysis of the neuraminidase genes. During the first 3 years of NAI use (1999 to 2002), 2,287 isolates were tested. Among them, eight (0.33%) viruses had a >10-fold decrease in susceptibility to oseltamivir, one (0.22%) in 1999 to 2000, three (0.36%) in 2000 to 2001, and four (0.41%) in 2001 to 2002. Six had unique changes in the neuraminidase gene compared to neuraminidases of the same subtype in the influenza sequence database. Although only one of the mutations had previously been recognized in persons receiving NAIs, none were from patients who were known to have received the drugs. During the 3 years preceding NAI use, no resistant variants were detected among 1,054 viruses. Drug use was relatively stable during the period, except for an approximate 10-fold increase in oseltamivir use in Japan during the third year. The frequency of variants with decreased sensitivity to the NAIs did not increase significantly during this period, but continued surveillance is required, especially in regions with higher NAI use.
Antiviral Agents↗
Importance of neuraminidase active-site residues to the neuraminidase inhibitor resistance of influenza viruses.
Neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs) are antivirals designed to target conserved residues at the neuraminidase (NA) enzyme active site in influenza A and B viruses. The conserved residues that interact with NAIs are under selective pressure, but only a few have been linked to resistance. In the A/Wuhan/359/95 (H3N2) recombinant virus background, we characterized seven charged, conserved NA residues (R118, R371, E227, R152, R224, E276, and D151) that directly interact with the NAIs but have not been reported to confer resistance to NAIs. These NA residues were replaced with amino acids that possess side chains having similar properties to maintain their original charge. The NA mutations we introduced significantly decreased NA activity compared to that of the A/Wuhan/359/95 recombinant wild-type and R292K (an NA mutation frequently reported to confer resistance) viruses, which were analyzed for comparison. However, the recombinant viruses differed in replication efficiency when we serially passaged them in vitro; the growth of the R118K and E227D viruses was most impaired. The R224K, E276D, and R371K mutations conferred resistance to both zanamivir and oseltamivir, while the D151E mutation reduced susceptibility to oseltamivir only (approximately 10-fold) and the R152K mutation did not alter susceptibility to either drug. Because the R224K mutation was genetically unstable and the emergence of the R371K mutation in the N2 subtype is statistically unlikely, our results suggest that only the E276D mutation is likely to emerge under selective pressure. The results of our study may help to optimize the design of NAIs.
Animals↗
Comparison of the replication of influenza A viruses in Chinese ring-necked pheasants and chukar partridges.
We investigated the replication and transmission of avian influenza A viruses in two species thought to be intermediate hosts in the spread of influenza A viruses in live poultry markets: Chinese ring-necked pheasants and chukar partridges. All 15 hemagglutinin subtypes replicated in pheasants, and most subtypes transmitted to naïve contact pheasants, primarily via the fecal-oral route. Many viruses were shed from the gastrointestinal tract of experimentally inoculated pheasants for 14 days or longer. Virus was isolated from the cloacal swabs of one contact pheasant for an unprecedented 45 days. Chukar partridges were less susceptible to infection with avian influenza viruses. The viruses that replicated in chukar partridges were isolated for 7 days after experimental inoculation, predominantly from the respiratory tract. We detected high neutralizing antibody titers with correspondingly low levels of serum hemagglutination inhibition antibody titers in pheasants and chukar partridges when chicken red blood cells were used in serological analyses. When horse erythrocytes were used, antibody titers were comparable to those obtained by using the neutralization assay. More importantly, the results suggested that pheasants can serve as a reservoir of influenza virus. Because of their continuous asymptomatic infection and longer stay in the markets, pheasants are ideal "carriers" of influenza A viruses. Their continued presence in live markets contributes to the perpetuation and genetic interaction of influenza viruses there. On the basis of our findings, it does not make good sense to ban quail but not pheasants from the live markets.
Animals↗
H5N1 outbreaks and enzootic influenza.
Ongoing outbreaks of H5N1 avian influenza in migratory waterfowl, domestic poultry, and humans in Asia during the summer of 2005 present a continuing, protean pandemic threat. We review the zoonotic source of highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses and their genesis from their natural reservoirs. The acquisition of novel traits, including lethality to waterfowl, ferrets, felids, and humans, indicates an expanding host range. The natural selection of nonpathogenic viruses from heterogeneous subpopulations co-circulating in ducks contributes to the spread of H5N1 in Asia. Transmission of highly pathogenic H5N1 from domestic poultry back to migratory waterfowl in western China has increased the geographic spread. The spread of H5N1 and its likely reintroduction to domestic poultry increase the need for good agricultural vaccines. In fact, the root cause of the continuing H5N1 pandemic threat may be the way the pathogenicity of H5N1 viruses is masked by co-circulating influenza viruses or bad agricultural vaccines.
Animal Migration↗
Domestic ducks and H5N1 influenza epidemic, Thailand.
In addition to causing 12 human deaths and 17 cases of human infection, the 2004 outbreak of H5N1 influenza virus in Thailand resulted in the death or slaughter of 60 million domestic fowl and the disruption of poultry production and trade. After domestic ducks were recognized as silent carriers of H5N1 influenza virus, government teams went into every village to cull flocks in which virus was detected; these team efforts markedly reduced H5N1 infection. Here we examine the pathobiology and epidemiology of H5N1 influenza virus in the 4 systems of duck raising used in Thailand in 2004. No influenza viruses were detected in ducks raised in "closed" houses with high biosecurity. However, H5N1 influenza virus was prevalent among ducks raised in "open" houses, free-ranging (grazing) ducks, and backyard ducks.
Animal Husbandry↗
H5N1 influenza viruses in Lao People's Democratic Republic.
A prospective surveillance program for influenza viruses was established in Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR) in July of 2005. We report isolation of H5N1 virus genetically distinct from H5N1 circulating in 2004, which indicates reintroduction of H5N1 into Lao PDR after its disappearance (i.e., no virologic or serologic evidence) for 2 years.
Animals↗