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Robert M Veatch

Publications and source records attributed to Robert M Veatch.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

How philosophy of medicine has changed medical ethics.

The celebration of thirty years of publication of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy provides an opportunity to reflect on how medical ethics has evolved over that period. The reshaping of the field has occurred in no small part because of the impact of branches of philosophy other than ethics. These have included influences from Kantian theory of respect for persons, personal identity theory, philosophy of biology, linguistic analysis of the concepts of health and disease, personhood theory, epistemology, and political philosophy. More critically, medicine itself has begun to be reshaped. The most fundamental restructuring of medicine is currently occurring--stemming, in part, from the application of contemporary philosophy of science to the medical field. There is no journal more central to these critical events of the past three decades than The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.

Abortion, Induced↗

The death of whole-brain death: the plague of the disaggregators, somaticists, and mentalists.

In its October 2001 issue, this journal published a series of articles questioning the Whole-Brain-based definition of death. Much of the concern focused on whether somatic integration-a commonly understood basis for the whole-brain death view-can survive the brain's death. The present article accepts that there are insurmountable problems with whole-brain death views, but challenges the assumption that loss of somatic integration is the proper basis for pronouncing death. It examines three major themes. First, it accepts the claim of the "disaggregators" that some behaviors traditionally associated with death can be unbundled, but argues that other behaviors (including organ procurement) must continue to be associated. Second, it rejects the claims of the "somaticists," that the integration of the body is critical, arguing instead for equating death with the irreversible loss of "embodied consciousness," that is, the loss of integration of bodily and mental function. Third, it defends higher-brain views against the charge that they are necessarily "mentalist," that is, that they equate death with losing some mental function such as consciousness or personhood. It argues, instead, for the integration of bodily and mental function as the critical feature of human life and that its irreversible loss constitutes death.

Attitude to Death↗

The nondirected living donor program: a model for cooperative donation, recovery and allocation of living donor kidneys.

We describe an altruistic nondirected (ND) and live donor/deceased donor list exchange (LE) donor program administered by an organ procurement organization (OPO) in the Washington, DC area. Screening eliminated 25 donors (17 NE; 8 LE) from the 97 donor applications (62 ND; 35 LE) completed. Twenty-one donors (16 ND; 5 LE) failed to follow through with the psychiatric evaluation, which eliminated 13 donors (9 ND; 4 LE). Two donors dropped out and 12 (9 ND; 3 LE) were medically unsuitable after final clinical evaluation. Twenty donor procedures were performed (10 ND; 10 LE) with four pending (2 ND; 2 LE). This resulted in a modest 3-5% increase in the OPO-procured kidney organ pool. The average cold ischemia time of the grafts not transported between transplant centers was 205 +/- 66 min compared with 243 +/- 48 min for transported grafts. With no documented adverse outcomes, donors had a hospital stay of length 2.9 days and at home recuperation of 12.3 days. Three- and 6-month creatinines were 1.44 +/- 1.36 and 1.68 +/- 0.61 for grafts not transported between transplant centers, and 1.6 +/- 0.27 and 1.6 +/- 0.44 for transported grafts. An OPO-administered altruistic donor program can serve as a model for cooperative donation, recovery and allocation of living donor kidneys.

Adult↗

Disaster preparedness and triage: justice and the common good.

"Triage" is a term generally referring to the social practice of sorting or categorizing. While it originally had an innocent, commercial meaning referring to sorting crops according to quality, the term quickly took on a more ominous meaning referring to classifying battlefield casualties into three groups: those too well-off to be treated and then, among those more seriously wounded, one group that will get medical attention and another that will not. The moral problem is how to distinguish between the latter two groups. The Hippocratic oath has been utterly useless in helping us do this sorting, since the oath commands the clinician to remain loyal to the individual patient and give no attention to the choice between two patients with different needs. Baker and Strosberg show that historically the British sorted following utilitarian principles, giving priority to the patients who could benefit the most even if they were not in greatest need, while the French arranged patients who could be helped in order of greatest need even if it was not maximally efficient to do so. Understanding how contemporary organ transplant policy utilizes triage can help us clarify our mass disaster triage policy. Two organ transplant examples--tissue typing for kidneys and geographical priority for allocating livers--show that American social policy, when forced to choose between allocating on the basis of efficiency or allocating on the basis of justice, will consider both principles, but give equal or dominant priority to justice--even though this priority is understood to be relatively inefficient. Since health care professionals have a recognized preference for efficiency over justice and lay people are inclined towards justice, leaving mass disaster triage policy in the hands of health professionals will predictably structure the policy in a way that conflicts with the moral priorities of the lay population. Formal public debate that recognizes the conflict between efficiency and equity--professional and lay priorities--is therefore essential.

Disasters↗

Abandon the dead donor rule or change the definition of death?

Research by Siminoff and colleagues reveals that many lay people in Ohio classify legally living persons in irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state (PVS) as dead that additional respondents, although classifying such patients as living, would be willing to procure organs from them. This paper analyzes possible implications of these findings for public policy. A majority would procure organs from those in irreversible coma or in PVS. Two strategies for legitimizing such procurement are suggested. One strategy would be to make exceptions to the dead donor rule permitting procurement from those in PVS or at least those who are in irreversible coma while continuing to classify them as living. Another strategy would be to further amend the definition of death to classify one or both groups as deceased, thus permitting procurement without violation of the dead donor rule. Permitting exceptions to the dead donor rule would require substantial changes in law--such as authorizing procuring surgeons to end the lives of patients by means of organ procurement--and would weaken societal prohibitions on killing. The paper suggests that it would be easier and less controversial to further amend the definition of death to classify those in irreversible coma and PVS as dead. Incorporation of a conscience clause to permit those whose religious or philosophical convictions support whole-brain or cardiac-based death pronouncement would avoid violating their beliefs while causing no more than minimal social problems. The paper questions whether those who would support an exception to the dead donor rule in these cases and those who would support a further amendment to the definition of death could reach agreement to adopt a public policy permitting organ procurement of those in irreversible coma or PVS when proper consent is obtained.

Brain Damage, Chronic↗

Inactivating a total artificial heart: special moral problems.

It seems generally correct that patients (or their valid surrogates) should be able to withdraw consent for the use of the total artificial heart (TAH) just as they presently may withdraw consent for other life-prolonging technologies such as the ventilator, but lingering moral problems remain with such decisions. First, should patients be permitted to demand actual removal of the TAH rather than mere deactivation? Second, foregoing other life-prolonging technologies is normally considered "indirect" killing and is therefore judged legal (as well as moral to those who accept only indirect killing). As long as the society includes irreversible stoppage of the heart as one of the criteria for death, however, stopping a TAH will be considered direct killing, i.e., murder. To circumvent this inconsistency, society must change its conclusion that stopping other life-prolonging technologies is merely indirect killing, explicitly legalize direct killing by means of stopping a TAH, or revisit the definition of death to eliminate the cardiac standard for death from the definition of death. Assuming that the stopping of the TAH with patient or surrogate consent is acceptable, we must then face the question of whether physicians who believe the TAH is serving no purpose can unilaterally stop the device against the wishes of a patient or surrogate who believes it is still serving a worthwhile purpose. Clinicians should be presumed authoritative in determining the predicted effect of the TAH, but, if the TAH can temporarily prolong life for a patient in a way that is desired by the patient or surrogate, case law, professional society recommendation, and moral analysis all support the conclusion that the TAH must be continued even against the conscientious objection of the physician

Advance Directives↗

Why liberals should accept financial incentives for organ procurement.

Free market libertarians have long supported incentives to increase organ procurement, but those oriented to justice traditionally have opposed them. This paper presents the reasons why those worried about justice should reconsider financial incentives and tolerate them as a lesser moral evil. After considering concerns about discrimination and coercion and setting them aside, it is suggested that the real moral concern should be manipulation of the neediest. The one offering the incentive (the government) has the resources to eliminate the basic needs that pressure the poor into a willingness to sell. It is unethically manipulative to withhold those resources and then offer payment for organs. Nevertheless, the poor have been left without basic necessities for 20 years since the passage of the prohibition on incentives. As long as the government continues to withhold a decent minimum of welfare, liberals should, with shame, cease opposing financial incentives for organ procurement.

Coercion↗