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Rosalind McDougall

Publications and source records attributed to Rosalind McDougall.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Best interests, dementia, and end of life decision-making: the case of Mrs S.

In this paper, I present an ethical analysis of the case of an elderly woman with dementia, Mrs S. The hospital treating Mrs S sought to cease her dialysis treatment despite Mrs S's family's protestations that continuing the treatment was in her best interests. Assuming Brock's framework as a theoretical background, I consider the case in terms of three questions. Firstly, was 'best interests' the appropriate basis for deciding on a course of action in this situation? Secondly, assuming the appropriateness of a best interests principle, was it in Mrs S's best interests for the dialysis treatment to be withdrawn as the hospital suggested? And thirdly, if it was in Mrs S's best interests for dialysis to be withdrawn, was the hospital right to pursue this course of action in light of the family's disagreement? Based on the changes to the patient's 'self' associated with dementia, I argue that a best interests principle was appropriate, that continuing dialysis was not in Mrs S's best interests, and that the hospital should have pursued cessation of treatment, even in light of the family's contrary wishes.

Aged↗

Rethinking the 'right not to know'.

The idea that an individual has a 'right not to know' genetic information about himself or herself is entrenched in both the policy sphere and the genetic counselling ethos. In this paper, I interrogate this idea of a 'right not to know', questioning particularly its status as a right. I identify the conception of rights that seems to underlie the posited 'right not to know' as a conception of rights in which they are prioritised non-outweighable interests. Turning to a series of hypothetical situations in which the 'right not to know' is invoked, I argue that the 'right not to know' is not a right consistent with such a conception. The 'right not to know' can only exist in a framework of rights in which they lack significant moral weight. Thus, considering the gravity of rights in popular understanding, I suggest caution in continuing use of the phrase 'right not to know' in the context of genetic testing. This investigation suggests that structuring the debate around genetic ignorance in terms of the 'right not to know' is not conducive to moving forward ethical thinking in this area.

Genetic Counseling↗