Biomedical subjects

S J Handley

Publications and source records attributed to S J Handley.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2001

Necessity, possibility and belief: a study of syllogistic reasoning.

The present study extended the investigation of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning in two ways: (1) The effect was studied under instructions to decide whether conclusions were possible, as well as necessary, given the premises; and (2) the effect was studied for types of syllogism where people rarely endorse the conclusions as well as those (valid and fallacious) where endorsements are common. Three experiments are reported, which show first that there is a marked tendency to reject unbelievable conclusions relative to abstract or neutral controls on all kinds of syllogism and under both types of instruction. There was also significant evidence of positive belief bias (increased acceptance of believable conclusions) and of interactions between belief bias effects and logical form. The results are discussed with particular respect to accounts of belief bias offered by theorists in the mental-model tradition.

Cognition↗

PubMed2000

Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems.

Three experiments examined people's ability to incorporate base rate information when judging posterior probabilities. Specifically, we tested the (Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1996). Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgement under uncertainty. Cognition, 58, 1-73) conclusion that people's reasoning appears to follow Bayesian principles when they are presented with information in a frequency format, but not when information is presented as one case probabilities. First, we found that frequency formats were not generally associated with better performance than probability formats unless they were presented in a manner which facilitated construction of a set inclusion mental model. Second, we demonstrated that the use of frequency information may promote biases in the weighting of information. When participants are asked to express their judgements in frequency rather than probability format, they were more likely to produce the base rate as their answer, ignoring diagnostic evidence.

Adult↗

PubMed2000

The suppression of q card selections: evidence for deductive inference in Wason's selection task.

The results of three experiments investigating the role of deductive inference in Wason's selection task are reported. In Experiment 1, participants received either a standard one-rule problem or a task containing a second rule, which specified an alternative antecedent. Both groups of participants were asked to select those cards that they considered were necessary to test whether the rule common to both problems was true or false. The results showed a significant suppression of q card selections in the two-rule condition. In addition there was weak evidence for both decreased p selection and increased not-q selection. In Experiment 2 we again manipulated number of rules and found suppression of q card selections only. Finally, in Experiment 3 we compared one- and two-rule conditions with a two-rule condition where the second rule specified two alternative antecedents in the form of a disjunction. The q card selections were suppressed in both of the two-rule conditions but there was no effect of whether the second rule contained one or two alternative antecedents. We argue that our results support the claim that people make inferences about the unseen side of the cards when engaging with the indicative selection task.

Choice Behavior↗

PubMed1999

Falsifying mental models: testing the predictions of theories of syllogistic reasoning.

Four experiments are reported that tested the claim, drawn from mental models theory, that reasoners attempt to construct alternative representations of problems that might falsify preliminary conclusions they have drawn. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to indicate which alternative conclusion(s) they had considered in a syllogistic reasoning task. In Experiments 2-4, participants were asked to draw diagrams consistent with the premises, on the assumption that these diagrams would provide insights into the mental representation being used. In none of the experiments was there any evidence that people constructed more models for multiple-model than for single-model syllogisms, nor was there any correlation between number of models constructed and overall accuracy. The results are interpreted as showing that falsification of the kind proposed by mental models theory may not routinely occur in reasoning.

Humans↗

PubMed1997

Reasoning strategies for suppositional deductions.

Deductive reasoning shares with other forms of thinking a reliance on strategies, as shown by the results of three experiments on the nature and development of control strategies to solve suppositional deductions. These puzzles are based on assertors who may or may not be telling the truth, and their assertions about their status as truthtellers and liars. The first experiment shows that reasoners make backward inferences as well as forward inferences, to short-cut their way through the alternatives, and the generation of suppositions is a source of difficulty. The second experiment establishes that the elimination of the suppositional status of an individual does not render problems easier. The third experiment shows that reasoners can improve their reasoning accuracy and speed spontaneously, without feedback, and it clarifies the transfer of strategies and their development. We discuss the implications of these data for alternative theories of suppositional deduction and for the relationship between reasoning and other forms of thinking such as problem solving.

Adolescent↗