Biomedical subjects

Silvia De Monte

Publications and source records attributed to Silvia De Monte.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2003

Coherent regimes of globally coupled dynamical systems.

This Letter presents a method by which the mean field dynamics of a population of dynamical systems with parameter diversity and global coupling can be described in terms of a few macroscopic degrees of freedom. The method applies to populations of any size and functional form in the region of coherence. It requires linear variation or a narrow distribution for the dispersed parameter. Although an approximation, the method allows us to quantitatively study the transitions among the collective regimes as bifurcations of the effective macroscopic degrees of freedom. To illustrate, the phenomenon of oscillator death and the route to full locking are examined for chaotic oscillators with time scale mismatch.

Journal Article↗

PubMed2002

Replicator dynamics for optional public good games.

The public goods game represents a straightforward generalization of the prisoner's dilemma to an arbitrary number of players. Since the dominant strategy is to defect, both classical and evolutionary game theory predict the asocial outcome that no player contributes to the public goods. In contrast to the compulsory public goods game, optional participation provides a natural way to avoid deadlocks in the state of mutual defection. The three resulting strategies--collaboration or defection in the public goods game, as well as not joining at all--are studied by means of a replicator dynamics, which can be completely analysed in spite of the fact that the payoff terms are nonlinear. If cooperation is valuable enough, the dynamics exhibits a rock-scissors-paper type of cycling between the three strategies, leading to sizeable average levels of cooperation in the population. Thus, voluntary participation makes cooperation feasible. But for each strategy, the average payoff value remains equal to the earnings of those not participating in the public goods game.

Altruism↗

PubMed2002

Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games.

The evolution of cooperation among nonrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences. Reciprocal altruism fails to provide a solution if interactions are not repeated often enough or groups are too large. Punishment and reward can be very effective but require that defectors can be traced and identified. Here we present a simple but effective mechanism operating under full anonymity. Optional participation can foil exploiters and overcome the social dilemma. In voluntary public goods interactions, cooperators and defectors will coexist. We show that this result holds under very diverse assumptions on population structure and adaptation mechanisms, leading usually not to an equilibrium but to an unending cycle of adjustments (a Red Queen type of evolution). Thus, voluntary participation offers an escape hatch out of some social traps. Cooperation can subsist in sizable groups even if interactions are not repeated, defectors remain anonymous, players have no memory, and assortment is purely random.

Cooperative Behavior↗