Biomedical subjects

Stephen R Mitroff

Publications and source records attributed to Stephen R Mitroff.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2005

The relationship between object files and conscious perception.

Object files (OFs) are hypothesized mid-level representations which mediate our conscious perception of persisting objects-e.g. telling us 'which went where'. Despite the appeal of the OF framework, not previous research has directly explored whether OFs do indeed correspond to conscious percepts. Here we present at least one case wherein conscious percepts of 'which went where' in dynamic ambiguous displays diverge from the analogous correspondence computed by the OF system. Observers viewed a 'bouncing/streaming' display in which two identical objects moved such that they could have either bounced off or streamed past each other. We measured two dependent variables: (1) an explicit report of perceived bouncing or streaming; and (2) an implicit 'object-specific preview benefit' (OSPB), wherein a 'preview' of information on a specific object speeds the recognition of that information at a later point when it appears again on the same object (compared to when it reappears on a different object), beyond display-wide priming. When the displays were manipulated such that observers had a strong bias to perceive streaming (on over 95% of the trials), there was nevertheless a strong OSPB in the opposite direction-such that the object files appeared to have 'bounced' even though the percept 'streamed'. Given that OSPBs have been taken as a hallmark of the operation of object files, the five experiments reported here suggest that in at least some specialized (and perhaps ecologically invalid) cases, conscious percepts of 'which went where' in dynamic ambiguous displays can diverge from the mapping computed by the object-file system.

Attention↗

PubMed2004

Forming and updating object representations without awareness: evidence from motion-induced blindness.

The input to visual processing consists of an undifferentiated array of features which must be parsed into discrete units. Here we explore the degree to which conscious awareness is important for forming such object representations, and for updating them in the face of changing visual scenes. We do so by exploiting the phenomenon of motion-induced blindness (MIB), wherein salient (and even attended) objects fluctuate into and out of conscious awareness when superimposed onto certain global motion patterns. By introducing changes to unseen visual stimuli during MIB, we demonstrate that object representations can be formed and updated even without conscious access to those objects. Such changes can then influence not only how stimuli reenter awareness, but also what reenters awareness. We demonstrate that this processing encompasses simple object representations and also several independent Gestalt grouping cues. We conclude that flexible visual parsing over time and visual change can occur even without conscious perception. Methodologically, we conclude that MIB may be an especially useful tool for studying the role of awareness in visual processing and vice versa.

Awareness↗

PubMed2004

Seeing the disappearance of unseen objects.

Because of the massive amount of incoming visual information, perception is fundamentally selective. We are aware of only a small subset of our visual input at any given moment, and a great deal of activity can occur right in front of our eyes without reaching awareness. While previous work has shown that even salient visual objects can go unseen, here we demonstrate the opposite pattern, wherein observers perceive stimuli which are not physically present. In particular, we show in two motion-induced blindness experiments that unseen objects can momentarily reenter awareness when they physically disappear: in some situations, you can see the disappearance of something you can't see. Moreover, when a stimulus changes outside of awareness in this situation and then physically disappears, observers momentarily see the altered version--thus perceiving properties of an object that they had never seen before, after that object is already gone. This phenomenon of 'perceptual reentry' yields new insights into the relationship between visual memory and conscious awareness.

Awareness↗

PubMed2004

Divide and conquer: how object files adapt when a persisting object splits into two.

Coherent visual experience requires not only segmenting incoming visual input into a structured scene of objects, but also binding discrete views of objects into dynamic representations that persist across time and motion. However, surprisingly little work has explored the principles that guide the construction and maintenance of such persisting object representations. What causes a part of the visual field to be treated as the same object over time? In the cognitive development literature, a key principle of object persistence is cohesion: An object must always maintain a single bounded contour. Here we demonstrate for the first time that mechanisms of adult midlevel vision are affected by cohesion violations. Using the object-file framework, we tested whether object-specific preview benefits-a hallmark of persisting object representations-are obtained for dynamic objects that split into two during their motion. We found that these preview benefits do not fully persist through such cohesion violations without incurring significant performance costs. These results illustrate how cohesion is employed as a constraint that guides the maintenance of object representations in adult midlevel vision.

Cognition↗

PubMed2004

Nothing compares 2 views: change blindness can occur despite preserved access to the changed information.

Change blindness, the failure to detect visual changes that occur during a disruption, has increasingly been used to infer the nature of internal representations. If every change were detected, detailed representations of the world would have to be stored and accessible. However, because many changes are not detected, visual representations might not be complete, and access to them might be limited. Using change detection to infer the completeness of visual representations requires an understanding of the reasons for change blindness. This article provides empirical support for one such reason: change blindness resulting from the failure to compare retained representations of both the pre- and postchange information. Even when unaware of changes, observers still retained information about both the pre- and postchange objects on the same trial.

Awareness↗

PubMed2002

The siren song of implicit change detection.

Although change blindness could suggest that observers represent far less of their visual world than their conscious experience leads them to believe, they could fail to detect changes even if they fully represent all details. Reports of implicit change detection in the absence of awareness are consistent with the notion that observers' representations are more complete than previously thought. However, to provide convincing evidence, studies must separate implicit detection from explicit processes. This article reexamines the 3 primary claims of implicit change detection and, after replicating original findings, provides theoretical and empirical support for alternative, explicit explanations. Even if observers do represent more of the scene than previously thought, change detection might occur only through explicit comparisons.

Color Perception↗