Biomedical subjects

T Gilovich

Publications and source records attributed to T Gilovich.

14 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2001

Do others judge us as harshly as we think? Overestimating the impact of our failures, shortcomings, and mishaps.

When people suffer an embarrassing blunder, social mishap, or public failure, they often feel that their image has been severely tarnished in the eyes of others. Four studies demonstrate that these fears are commonly exaggerated. Actors who imagined committing one of several social blunders (Study 1), who experienced a public intellectual failure (Studies 2 and 3), or who were described in an embarrassing way (Study 4) anticipated being judged more harshly by others than they actually were. These exaggerated fears were produced, in part, by the actors' tendency to be inordinately focused on their misfortunes and by their resulting failure to consider the wider range of situational factors that tend to moderate onlookers' impressions. Discussion focuses on additional mechanisms that may contribute to overly pessimistic expectations as well as the role of such expectations in producing unnecessary social anxiety.

Adult↗

PubMed2001

Putting adjustment back in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic: differential processing of self-generated and experimenter-provided anchors.

People's estimates of uncertain quantities are commonly influenced by irrelevant values. These anchoring effects were originally explained as insufficient adjustment away from an initial anchor value. The existing literature provides little support for the postulated process of adjustment, however, and a consensus that none takes place seems to be emerging. We argue that this conclusion is premature, and we present evidence that insufficient adjustment produces anchoring effects when the anchors are self-generated. In Study 1, participants' verbal reports made reference to adjustment only, from self-generated anchors. In Studies 2 and 3, participants induced to accept values by nodding their heads gave answers that were closer to an anchor (i.e., they adjusted less) than participants induced to deny values by shaking their heads--again, only when the anchor was self-generated. These results suggest it is time to reintroduce anchoring and adjustment as an explanation for some judgments under uncertainty.

Adult↗

PubMed2000

The spotlight effect in social judgment: an egocentric bias in estimates of the salience of one's own actions and appearance.

This research provides evidence that people overestimate the extent to which their actions and appearance are noted by others, a phenomenon dubbed the spotlight effect. In Studies 1 and 2, participants who were asked to don a T-shirt depicting either a flattering or potentially embarrassing image overestimated the number of observers who would be able to recall what was pictured on the shirt. In Study 3, participants in a group discussion overestimated how prominent their positive and negative utterances were to their fellow discussants. Studies 4 and 5 provide evidence supporting an anchoring-and-adjustment interpretation of the spotlight effect. In particular, people appear to anchor on their own rich phenomenological experience and then adjust--insufficiently--to take into account the perspective of others. The discussion focuses on the manifestations and implications of the spotlight effect across a host of everyday social phenomena.

Adolescent↗

PubMed1998

The illusion of transparency: biased assessments of others' ability to read one's emotional states.

Three sets of studies provide evidence for an illusion of transparency, or a tendency for people to overestimate the extent to which others can discern their internal states. People often mistakenly believe that their internal states "leak out" more than they really do. The authors attribute this bias to a tendency for people to adjust insufficiently from the "anchor" of their own phenomenological experience when attempting to take another's perspective. Evidence for this illusion is provided by showing that liars overestimate the detectability of their lies (Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c) and that people believe their feelings of disgust are more apparent than they actually are (Studies 2a and 2b). A final pair of experiments (Studies 3a and 3b) explores the implications of the illusion of transparency for people's reluctance to intervene in emergencies. All 3 sets of studies also provide evidence consistent with the proposed anchoring and adjustment interpretation.

Affect↗

PubMed1995

When less is more: counterfactual thinking and satisfaction among Olympic medalists.

Research on counterfactual thinking has shown that people's emotional responses to events are influenced by their thoughts about "what might have been." The authors extend these findings by documenting a familiar occasion in which those who are objectively better off nonetheless feel worse. In particular, an analysis of the emotional reactions of bronze and silver medalists at the 1992 Summer Olympics--both at the conclusion of their events and on the medal stand--indicates that bronze medalists tend to be happier than silver medalists. The authors attribute these results to the fact that the most compelling counterfactual alternative for the silver medalist is winning the gold, whereas for the bronze medalist it is finishing without a medal. Support for this interpretation was obtained from the 1992 Olympics and the 1994 Empire State Games. The discussion focuses on the implications of endowment and contrast for well being.

Achievement↗

PubMed1995

The experience of regret: what, when, and why.

This article reviews evidence indicating that there is a temporal pattern to the experience of regret. Actions, or errors of commission, generate more regret in the short term; but inactions, or errors of omission, produce more regret in the long run. The authors contend that this temporal pattern is multiply determined, and present a framework to organize the divergent causal mechanisms that are responsible for it. In particular, this article documents the importance of psychological processes that (a) decrease the pain of regrettable action over time, (b) bolster the pain of regrettable inaction over time, and (c) differentially affect the cognitive availability of these two types of regrets. Both the functional and cultural origins of how people think about regret are discussed.

Affect↗

PubMed1995

Failing to act: regrets of Terman's geniuses.

The regrets reported by Terman's intellectually gifted subjects were analyzed to determine the nature of their regrets, whether they are the same as those reported by the general population, and whether they stem predominantly from errors of omission or commission. A 1986 survey of these subjects in their advanced years (mean age = 74) asked them to specify what they would do differently if they could live over again. An analysis of their responses indicated that, like the population as a whole, they harbor many more regrets of inaction than regrets of action. The implications of these findings for a proposed temporal pattern to the experience of regret is discussed.

Aged↗

PubMed1994

The temporal pattern to the experience of regret.

Through telephone surveys, written questionnaires, and face-to-face interviews, it was found that people's biggest regrets tend to involve things they have failed to do in their lives. This conflicts with research on counterfactual thinking that indicates that people regret unfortunate outcomes that stem from actions taken more than identical outcomes that result from actions foregone. These divergent findings were reconciled by demonstrating that people's regrets follow a systematic time course: Actions cause more pain in the short-term, but inactions are regretted more in the long run. Support for this contention was obtained in 2 scenario experiments that assessed people's beliefs about the short- and long-term regrets of others and in an experiments that asked Ss about their own regrets of action and inaction from 2 time periods. Several mechanisms that can account for this temporal pattern are discussed.

Adult↗

PubMed1993

Effect of temporal perspective on subjective confidence.

Four studies examined whether people tend to lose confidence in their prospects for success the closer they are to the "moment of truth." Study 1 found that students think they will do better on their midterm exams when asked on the 1st day of class than when asked on the day of the exam. Studies 2 and 4 replicated this finding under controlled conditions. Study 3 demonstrated that the same effect holds retrospectively: People are more confident that they would have performed well at a task long after the time to perform has passed. Data are presented indicating that these results stem from a tendency for people to feel more "accountable" for their assessments, and thus focus less on the causes of success and more on the causes of failure, as the time to perform approaches. Implications for the experience of regret are discussed.

Adult↗

PubMed1993

Effect of temporal focus on the recall of expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent information.

This research examined the impact of temporal focus on the recall of information that is consistent or inconsistent with an expectation. A consistent pattern of results across 4 experiments indicates that when Ss' expectations are temporally unfocused, better memory for consistent information is observed. In contrast, when expectations are focused in time--that is, Ss know when the relevant events are likely to occur--recall for consistent and inconsistent information is more balanced. Experiment 4 tied these recall findings to the amount of processing devoted to consistent and inconsistent events. When expectations were temporally unfocused, processing time and recall was greater for the confirmatory information. When expectations were temporally focused, more equivalent processing time and recall of consistent and inconsistent information was observed. Discussion centers on the role of temporal focus as a determinant of whether an event is one-sided or two-sided.

Adult↗

PubMed1990

Differential construal and the false consensus effect.

People's own beliefs, values, and habits tend to bias their perceptions of how widely they are shared. The present research examined whether this "false consensus effect" is partly due to people's failure to recognize that their choices are not solely a function of the "objective" response alternatives, but of their subjective construal of those alternatives. Study 1 provided initial support for the importance of differential construal in people's consensus estimates by showing that larger false consensus effects tend to be obtained on items that permit the most latitude for subjective construal. Study 2 replicated this effect experimentally by asking Ss either a general or specific version of the same question. Larger false consensus effects were obtained on the general version that offered more latitude for construal. Studies 3 & 4 provided further support by showing that (a) Ss who made different choices tended to interpret the response alternatives in ways that reflected the choices they made and (b) subjects who were led to construe the alternatives in the same way tended to make the same choices.

Adult↗

PubMed1989

Effect of memory perspective on retrospective causal attributions.

Two studies examined whether people's retrospective causal attributions might be mediated by the visual perspective from which events are recalled. In Study 1, pairs of Ss participated in "get-acquainted" conversations and made a series of attribution ratings for their performance. They returned 3 weeks later to rerate their performance on the same attribution scales and to indicate the perspective from which they remembered their earlier conversation. Ss reported either "observer" memories in which they could "see" themselves from the outside or "field" memories in which their field of view matched that of the original situation. Study 2 was identical to Study 1 with the exception that Ss' memory perspectives were manipulated via verbal instructions. In both experiments, conversations that were recalled from an observer's perspective were attributed more dispositionally. These results suggest that the different perspectives from which events can be recalled function much like the divergent visual perspectives available to actors and observers in immediate, everyday experience. Discussion of these results focuses on how they further understanding of the contradictory findings reported in the literature on temporal shifts in attributions.

Attention↗

PubMed1988

The dark side of self- and social perception: black uniforms and aggression in professional sports.

Black is viewed as the color of evil and death in virtually all cultures. With this association in mind, we were interested in whether a cue as subtle as the color of a person's clothing might have a significant impact on his or her behavior. To test this possibility, we examined whether professional football and ice hockey teams that wear black uniforms are more aggressive than those that wear nonblack uniforms. An analysis of the penalty records of the National Football League and the National Hockey League indicate that teams with black uniforms in both sports ranked near the top of their leagues in penalties throughout the period of study. On those occasions when a team switched from nonblack to black uniforms, the switch was accompanied by an immediate increase in penalties. The results of two laboratory experiments indicate that this finding can be attributed to both social perception and self-perception processes--that is, to the biased judgments of referees and to the increased aggressiveness of the players themselves. Our discussion focuses on the theoretical implications of these data for an understanding of the variable, or "situated," nature of the self.

Adult↗

PubMed1983

Biased evaluation and persistence in gambling.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of gambling behavior is that people continue to gamble despite persistent failure. One reason for this persistence may be that gamblers evaluate outcomes in a biased manner. Specifically, gamblers may tend to accept wins at face value but explain away or discount losses. Experiment 1 tested this hypothesis by recording subjects' explanations of the outcomes of their bets on professional football games. The results supported the hypothesis: Subjects spent more time explaining their losses than their wins. A content analysis of these explanations revealed that subjects tended to discount their losses but "bolster" their wins Finally, subjects remembered their losses better during a recall test 3 weeks later. Experiments 2 and 3 extended this analysis by demonstrating that a manipulation of the salience or existence of a critical "fluke" play in a sporting event had a greater impact on the subsequent expectations of those who had bet on the losing team than of those who had bet on the winning team. Both the implications and the possible mechanisms underlying these biases are discussed.

Attitude↗