PubMed Health⌕ Search

Biomedical subjects

Ted Ruffman

Publications and source records attributed to Ted Ruffman.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

Differences in the way older and younger adults rate threat in faces but not situations.

We compared young and healthy older adults' ability to rate photos of faces and situations (e.g., sporting activities) for the degree of threat they posed. Older adults did not distinguish between more and less dangerous faces to the same extent as younger adults did. In contrast, we found no significant age differences in young and older adults' ability to distinguish between high- and low-danger situations. The differences between young and older adults on the face task were independent of age differences in older adults' fluid IQ. We discuss results in relation to differences between young and older adults on emotion-recognition tasks; we also discuss sociocognitive and neuropsychological (e.g., amygdala) theories of aging.

Adolescent↗

Young infants' expectations about hidden objects.

Infants aged 3-5 months (mean of approximately 4 months) were given a novel anticipatory looking task to test object permanence understanding. They were trained to expect an experimenter to retrieve an object from behind a transparent screen upon hearing a cue ("Doors up, here comes the hand"). The experimenter then hid the object behind one of two opaque screens and after either 2 or 8s gave the "doors up" cue. Infants looked to the correct location after the two-second delay, but not after the eight-second delay. This indicates a brief memory that the object is present behind the occluder. The study provides converging evidence that infants grasp object permanence by a young age. The novel anticipatory looking paradigm helps rule out counter-explanations applied to violation-of-expectation tasks.

Attention↗

Emotion recognition deficits in the elderly.

In two studies, healthy elderly adults were poor at recognizing certain emotions. In study one, an emotion face morphed to express a new emotion. The elderly were impaired when recognizing anger and sadness, whereas no differences were found between the two age groups in recognizing fear or happiness, or in a task requiring reasoning about non=emotion stimuli. In study two, the elderly were impaired when judging which of two faces was more angry, sad, or fearful, but they were not impaired when judging other emotions or when judging which of two beakers was more full. The elderly were also impaired when matching emotion sounds to angry, sad, and disgusted faces, but not to other emotions and not when matching non-emotion (e.g., machine) sounds to machines. Elderly deficits were independent of performance on a task requiring basic face processing (gender recognition). Overall, the results provide support for an age-related decline in the recognition of some emotions that is independent of changes in perceptual abilities, processing speed, fluid IQ, basic face processing abilities, and reasoning about non face stimuli. Recognition of emotion stimuli might be mediated by regions of the brain that are independent from those associated with a more general cognitive decline.

Adult↗

Social understanding: How does it fare with advancing years?

Until recently, theory of mind abilities have received little attention beyond the childhood years. However, pioneering work carried out by Happé, Winner, and Brownell (1998) has opened the doors on a new and exciting area of research that examines theory of mind abilities in later years. Happé et al. reported that theory of mind performance was superior in the elderly. Yet, in direct contrast to these findings, Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, and Taylor (2002) report a decline in theory of mind abilities with advancing years. We used Happé et al.'s task and, like Maylor et al., found a decline in theory of mind abilities in the elderly. Yet this deficit was related to a decline in fluid abilities. We then examined whether deficits in social understanding in the elderly could also be independent of fluid abilities. We used two new tasks; identifying emotions from still photos and identifying emotions and cognitions from video clips. Again we found a decline in social understanding in the elderly, and in this case, the decline was independent of changes in fluid abilities.

Aged↗

The relation between children's and mothers' mental state language and theory-of-mind understanding.

This study investigated the relation between mothers' utterances and theory of mind in a longitudinal study involving three time points over 1 year. Mothers were asked to describe some pictures to 82 children at all three time points. Mothers' use of mental state utterances in these descriptions at early time points was consistently correlated with later theory-of-mind understanding. This was true even when a number of potential mediators were accounted for, including children's own use of mental state language, their earlier theory-of-mind understanding, their language ability, their age, mothers' education, and other types of mother utterances. Mothers' mental state utterances seemed genuinely causal because early theory-of-mind ability was not related to later mother mental state utterances (i.e., it was not a reciprocal relation). Results also showed that children's desire talk preceded their talk about beliefs.

Child↗

Are A-not-B errors caused by a belief about object location?

Eight- to 12-month-olds might make A-not-B errors, knowing the object is in B but searching at A because of ancillary (attention, inhibitory, or motor memory) deficits, or they might genuinely believe the object is in A (conceptual deficit). This study examined how diligently infants searched for a hidden object they never found. An object was placed in A twice, and then in B. In a different task the object was placed beside A twice, and then in B. Infants made more A-not-B errors in the former task, and perseverating infants searched diligently in A rather than in B. Infants seemed to believe the object was in A, suggesting that both a conceptual deficit and ancillary deficits account for A-not-B errors.

Attention↗

Mother and infant talk about mental states relates to desire language and emotion understanding.

This study assessed the relation between mother mental state language and child desire language and emotion understanding in 15-24-month-olds. At both time points, mothers described pictures to their infants and mother talk was coded for mental and nonmental state language. Children were administered 2 emotion understanding tasks and their mental and nonmental state vocabulary levels were obtained via parental report. The results demonstrated that mother use of desire language with 15-month-old children uniquely predicted a child's later mental state language and emotion task performance, even after accounting for potentially confounding variables. In addition, mothers' tendency to refer to the child's over others' desires was the more consistent correlate of mental state language and emotion understanding.

Affect↗