Biomedical subjects

Thomas N Sherratt

Publications and source records attributed to Thomas N Sherratt.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2003

The evolution of locomotory behavior in profitable and unprofitable simulated prey.

Prey that are unprofitable to attack (for example, those containing noxious chemicals) frequently exhibit slower and more predictable movement than species that lack these defenses. Possible explanations for the phenomenon include a lack of selection pressure on unprofitable prey to avoid predators and active selection on unprofitable prey to advertise their noxiousness. We explicitly tested these and other hypotheses using a novel "artificial world" in which the locomotory characteristics (step size, waiting time, and angular direction) of artificial profitable and unprofitable computer-generated prey were subject to continued selection by humans over a number of generations. Unprofitable prey evolved significantly slower movement behavior than profitable prey when they were readily recognized as unprofitable, and also when they frequently survived predatory attacks. This difference arose primarily as a consequence of more intense selection on profitable prey to avoid capture. When unprofitable prey were very similar (but not identical) in morphological appearance to profitable prey, unprofitable prey evolved particularly slow movement behavior, presumably because when they were slow-moving they could be more readily recognized as being unprofitable. When unprofitable prey were constrained to move slowly, a morphologically identical profitable prey species evolved locomotor mimicry only when it had no more effective means of avoiding predation. Overall, our results provide some of the first empirical support for a number of earlier hypotheses for differences in movement between unprofitable and profitable prey and demonstrate that locomotor mimicry is not an inevitable outcome of selection even in morphologically similar prey.

Animals↗

PubMed2003

The evolution of warning signals as reliable indicators of prey defense.

It is widely argued that defended prey have tended to evolve conspicuous traits because predators more readily learn to avoid defended prey when they are conspicuous. However, a rival theory proposes that defended prey have evolved such characters because it allows them to be distinguished from undefended prey. Here we investigated how the attributes of defended (unprofitable) and undefended (profitable) computer-generated prey species tended to evolve when they were subject to selection by foraging humans. When cryptic forms of defended and undefended species were similar in appearance but their conspicuous forms were not, defended prey became conspicuous while undefended prey remained cryptic. Indeed, in all of our experiments, defended prey invariably evolved any trait that enabled them to be distinguished from undefended prey, even if such traits were cryptic. When conspicuous mutants of defended prey were extremely rare, they frequently overcame their initial disadvantage by chance. When Batesian mimicry of defended species was possible, defended prey evolved unique traits or characteristics that would make undefended prey vulnerable. Overall, our work supports the contention that warning signals are selected for their reliability as indicators of defense rather than to capitalize on any inherent educational biases of predators.

Animals↗

PubMed2002

Behaviorial evolution: does similarity breed cooperation?

Reciprocity, whether direct or indirect, is thought to be the key to establishing cooperation among non-relatives. But Riolo et al. have presented a model in which cooperation is instead based on similarity: agents donate only when their partner's 'tag' lies within a 'tolerance' range around their own. Here we point out that their model requires individuals with identical tags to cooperate with each other, and show that cooperation tends to collapse when individuals bearing identical tags are given the option of not donating. We therefore question their mechanism for maintaining cooperation without reciprocity.

Altruism↗

PubMed2002

The coevolution of warning signals.

It has long been recognized that defended prey tend to be conspicuous. Current theories suggest that the association ('aposematism') has arisen because predators more readily learn to avoid attacking defended phenotypes when they are conspicuous. In this paper, I consider why such psychology has evolved. In particular, I argue that aposematism may have evolved not because of an independent and pre-existing receiver bias, but because the conspicuousness of a prey item provides a reliable indicator of its likelihood of being defended. To develop my case I consider how warning signals might coevolve in a system containing a number of predators, whose foraging behaviour is also subject to selection. In these cases, models readily show that the greater the conspicuousness of a novel prey item, the more likely that it has been encountered by other predators and survived. As a consequence, naive predators should be less likely to attack highly conspicuous novel prey on encounter, or at least more inclined to attack them cautiously. This adaptive predator behaviour will greatly facilitate the spread of aposematic phenotypes from extreme rarity, which in turn will enhance selection for forms of predator behaviour under which aposematism will coevolve even more readily.

Animals↗

PubMed2002

The stability of cooperation involving variable investment.

In this paper, we attempt to reconcile the results of several studies which have investigated the evolution of cooperation between non-relatives in systems where investment in partners can vary. In contrast to previous proposals, we show for the first time that variable-investment cooperation can be readily maintained in inter-species mutualistic relationships even in the absence of spatial structure, but that the stability of this interaction is dependent on the particular investment-response rule that is employed. By allowing the evolution of investment-response parameters in both inter- and intra-specific versions of the continuous variable-investment Prisoners' Dilemma we show that, in the absence of further factors, the raise-the stakes (RTS) strategy is likely to evolve into a simpler, variable investment form of Give-as-Good-as-you-Get that initially offers a high fixed amount and subsequently matches its partner's investment. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that genuine RTS-like strategies will still be selected if two intuitively reasonable conditions hold: if individuals are limited in terms of the total they can invest in cooperative actions over their lifetimes, and if there are always some individuals in a population that cannot cooperate.

Animals↗