Biomedical subjects

Tim Thornton

Publications and source records attributed to Tim Thornton.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

PubMed2006

Tacit knowledge as the unifying factor in evidence based medicine and clinical judgement.

The paper outlines the role that tacit knowledge plays in what might seem to be an area of knowledge that can be made fully explicit or codified and which forms a central element of Evidence Based Medicine. Appeal to the role the role of tacit knowledge in science provides a way to unify the tripartite definition of Evidence Based Medicine given by Sackett et al: the integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values. Each of these three elements, crucially including research evidence, rests on an ineliminable and irreducible notion of uncodified good judgement. The paper focuses on research evidence, drawing first on the work of Kuhn to suggest that tacit knowledge contributes, as a matter of fact, to puzzle solving within what he calls normal science. A stronger argument that it must play a role in research is first motivated by looking to Collins' first hand account of replication in applied physics and then broader considerations of replication in justifying knowledge claims in scientific research. Finally, consideration of an argument from Wittgenstein shows that whatever explicit guidelines can be drawn up to guide judgement the specification of what counts as correctly following them has to remain implicit.Overall, the paper sets out arguments for the claim that even though explicit guidelines and codifications can play a practical role in informing clinical practice, they rest on a body of tacit or implicit skill that is in principle ineliminable. It forms the bedrock of good judgement and unites the integration of research, expertise and values.

Evidence-Based Medicine↗

PubMed2005

Looking with both eyes open: fact and value in psychiatric diagnosis?

IN THIS ARTICLE WE ARGUE THE CASE FOR A PROPOSAL: that psychiatry should recognise, embrace and take seriously the role of values, alongside facts, in diagnosis. We present a three-step argument in support of our proposal; we raise a number of key questions from the perspectives of different stakeholders in mental health; and we conclude with a note on the significance of our proposal for building a more equal relationship between patients and professionals.

Journal Article↗

PubMed2004

Wittgenstein and the limits of empathic understanding in psychopathology.

The aim of this paper is three-fold. Firstly, to briefly set out how strategic choices made about theorising about intentionality or content have actions at a distance for accounting for delusion. Secondly, to investigate how successfully a general difficulty facing a broadly interpretative approach to delusions might be eased by the application of any of three Wittgensteinian interpretative tools. Thirdly, to draw a general moral about how the later Wittgenstein gives more reason to be pessimistic than optimistic about the prospects of a philosophical psychopathology aimed at empathic understanding of delusions.

Cognition↗

PubMed2004

Jail drug and alcohol treatment program reduces recidivism in nonviolent offenders: a longitudinal study of Monroe County, New York's, Jail Treatment Drug and Alcohol Program.

Substance abuse treatment has become the new fashion for reducing recidivism among inmates. But the question is, does this work? Various studies have been done tracking the same cohort of inmates over time to assess the validity of treatment. This study assesses one treatment program's success over 5 years to determine if drug and alcohol treatment reduces recidivism among nonviolent, short-term (sentence of less than a year) inmates. Monroe County's drug treatment program demonstrates that for 1 year after receiving the treatment, three different cohorts of nonviolent, short-term inmates (1995, 1998, and 2000) were found to be substantially less likely to be recidivists than control group inmates.

Alcoholism↗

PubMed2002

Thought insertion, cognitivism, and inner space.

INTRODUCTION: Whatever its underlying causes, even the description of the phenomenon of thought insertion, of the content of the delusion, presents difficulty. It may seem that the best hope of a description comes from a broadly cognitivist approach to the mind which construes content-laden mental states as internal mental representations within what is literally an inner space: the space of the brain or nervous system. Such an approach objectifies thoughts in a way which might seem to hold out the prospect of describing the ''alienated'' relation to one's own thoughts that seems to be present in thought insertion.1 METHOD: Firstly, I examine the general structure of cognitivist accounts of intentional or content-laden mental states. I raise the general difficulty of explaining how free-standing, and thus world-independent, inner states can still have bearing on the outer world. Secondly, I briefly examine Frith's model for explaining thought insertion and other passivity phenomena by postulating a failure of an internal monitoring mechanism of inner states. I question what account can be given of non-pathological cases and raise two specific objects. RESULTS: Cognitivist accounts of the mind face a general, and possibly insuperable, challenge: explaining the intentionality of mental states in non-intentional, nonquestion-begging terms. There have so far been no satisfactory solutions. Cognitivist accounts of passivity phenomena in terms of a failure of internal monitoring face two objections. Firstly, accounting for non-pathological cases generates an infinite regress. Secondly, no account can be given of the paradoxical nature of utterances of the form of Moore's paradox: ''it is raining but I do not believe it''. CONCLUSIONS: A cognitivist approach presents an alienated account of thought in normal, non-pathological cases and is no help in accounting for thought insertion.

Journal Article↗