Impact of sex on hepatitis C virus transmission: conflicting results.
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Biomedical subjects
Publications and source records attributed to V Puro.
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In the last 2 decades, successive outbreaks caused by new, newly recognised and resurgent pathogens, and the risk that high-consequence pathogens might be used as bioterrorism agents amply demonstrated the need to enhance capacity in clinical and public health management of highly infectious diseases. In this article we review these recent and current threats to public health, whether naturally occurring or caused by accidental or intentional release. Moreover, we discuss some components of hospital preparedness for, and response to, infectious disease of the emergencies in developed countries. The issues of clinical awareness and education, initial investigation and management, surge capacity, communication, and caring for staff and others affected by the emergency are discussed. We also emphasise the importance of improving the everyday practice of infection control by healthcare professionals.
BACKGROUND: The World Health Organization (WHO) has recommended that a severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) alert should be raised when two or more healthcare workers (HCW) in the same health care unit fulfil the SARS clinical criteria, with onset of illness in the same 10-day period. However, in a number of European countries (including Italy) data on reasons for sickness absence are not routinely collected within current HCW worker sickness reporting systems, because of concerns about privacy. To help plan for the implementation of the proposed alert system in Italy, we aimed to determine the minimum number of alert cases defining a cluster. PATIENTS AND METHODS: Sickness absences longer than 7 days in HCW employed in three hospitals in 2003, were identified by checking the hospitals' administrative databases. HCW with onset of illness in the same 10-day period were contacted and asked whether they have been diagnosed with pneumonia. RESULTS: Overall, 273 absences > 7 days were recorded and 36 clusters of at least two absences > 7 days were identified; a total of 94 HCW were involved in these clusters. Only two HCW involved in different clusters, reported pneumonia. CONCLUSION: The occurrence of clusters of two or more cases of pneumonia in HCW in the same hospital unit appears to be an uncommon event, and thus the alert system proposed is not likely to result in large numbers of false positive alerts. However, it may be difficult to implement this alert system in countries where clinical data on sickness absences are not routinely collected, and alternative mechanisms should be considered.
BACKGROUND: Factors that influence the risk for HCV infection after occupational exposure to hepatitis C virus (HCV) have not yet been determined. The objective of this study was to assess potential risk factors for Hepatitis C seroconversion after occupational exposure to HCV. METHODS: We conducted a European matched case-control study from 01/01/1991 through 31/12/ 2002. Cases were Health Care Workers (HCWs) who were HCV seronegative at the time of exposure, sustained a documented exposure to HCV, and present documented HCV seroconversion temporally associated with the exposure. Controls-HCWs had a documented exposure to HCV, were HCV seronegative at the time of exposure, and remained so at least 6 months later. Controls were matched to cases for the center and the time period of the exposure occurrence. RESULTS: 60 cases and 204 controls were included. All cases were exposed to HCV-infected materials through percutaneous injuries. Those for whom information was available (61.6%) were exposed to viremic source patients. Multivariate conditional logistic regression analysis, in which HCV viral load was not introduced because of missing values, identified needle placed in the source patient's vein or artery (Odds Ratio [OR]=100.1; 95% Confidence Interval [CI]=7.3-1365.7), deep injury (OR=155.2; 95%CI=7.1-3417.2), and HCW's gender (M vs. F: OR=3.1; 95%CI=1.0-10.0) as risk factors for HCV infection. In univariate unmatched analysis the risk of HCV transmission was increased 11-fold (C195%=1.1-114.1) in HCWs exposed to sources with a viral load>6 log10 copies/mL when compared to sources with a HCV viral load<4 log10 copies/mL. CONCLUSION: The risk of HCV transmission after percutaneous exposure increases with a larger volume of blood, and, a higher titer of HCV in the source patient's blood. The role of HCW's gender need to be further investigated. The results of this study have important implications for counselling and follow-up of HCWs after exposure.
BACKGROUND: Additional studies are required to identify risk factors for hepatitis C virus (HCV) transmission to health care workers after occupational exposure to HCV. METHODS: We conducted a matched case-control study in 5 European countries from 1 January 1991 through 31 December 2002. Case patients were health care workers who experienced seroconversion after percutaneous or mucocutaneous exposure to HCV. Control subjects were HCV-exposed health care workers who did not experience seroconversion and were matched with case patients for center and period of exposure. RESULTS: Sixty case patients and 204 control subjects were included in the study. All case patients were exposed to HCV-infected fluids through percutaneous injuries. The 37 case patients for whom information was available were exposed to viremic source patients. As risk factors for HCV infection, multivariate analysis identified needle placement in a source patient's vein or artery (odds ratio [OR], 100.1; 95% confidence interval [CI], 7.3-1365.7), deep injury (OR, 155.2; 95% CI, 7.1-3417.2), and sex of the health care worker (OR for male vs. female, 3.1; 95% CI, 1.0-10.0). Source patient HCV load was not introduced in the multivariate model. In unmatched univariate analysis, the risk of HCV transmission increased 11-fold for health care workers exposed to source patients with a viral load >6 log(10) copies/mL (95% CI, 1.1-114.1), compared with exposures to source patients with a viral load < or =4 log10 copies/mL. CONCLUSION: In this study, HCV occupational transmission was found to occur after percutaneous exposures. The risk of HCV transmission after percutaneous exposure increased with deep injuries and procedures involving hollow-bore needle placement in the source patient's vein or artery. These results highlight the need for widespread adoption of needlestick-prevention devices in health care settings, together with other preventive measures.
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BACKGROUND: HIV spread among low-risk populations through heterosexual intercourse is a major public health concern. This study was aimed at describing prevalence and determinants of HIV infection among Italian low-risk subjects seeking their first lifetime HIV test. PATIENTS AND METHODS: Information collected between January 1990 and December 2000 at a major counseling and testing site in Rome, Italy, was analyzed. Multiple logistic regression odds ratios (OR) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) were computed. RESULTS: Among the 14,313 study subjects, 64 (0.4%) were seropositive for HIV infection. HIV seropositivity increased with age (OR = 4.0, 95% CI: 2.1-7.6 for >/= 40 years vs 18-24), and it seemed to be more common among men (OR = 1.6, lower 95% CI:0.9). There was no evidence of temporal variations, whereas motivations for HIV testing were strongly associated with HIV prevalence. Testing for alarming symptoms (OR = 13.8) or for heterosexual intercourse (OR = 11.0) were associated with a more than 10-fold increased HIV risk. CONCLUSION: Our findings are consistent with data from other industrialized countries and they show a strong association between HIV seropositivity and reason for first-time testing. Moreover, they indicate a stable trend of HIV prevalence among low-risk persons in the last decade. Further studies on time trends in low-risk populations would be useful to evaluate current HIV prevention programs.
Data from AIDS surveillance systems in the World Health Organization European region (1993-2001) were analysed to describe the main epidemiological aspects of recurrent bacterial pneumonia (RBP) as AIDS-defining illness (ADI) in Europe. Among the 153 756 AIDS cases analysed, 5796 (3.8%) had RBP. The proportion of RBP was higher (8.3%) in eastern than in western Europe (3.6%), possibly because of a greater propensity of certain countries to diagnose RBP. In western Europe, the proportion of RBP as ADI appeared to increase over time up to 1998 (from 2.5% to 4.5%), and declined thereafter (3.3% in 2001). RBP was strongly associated with intravenous drug use (odds ratio 3.0, 95% CI 2.7-3.3), whereas it did not differ in age groups or geographical areas. The study findings confirm the crucial role of intravenous drug use in the occurrence of RBP and suggest that highly active antiretroviral therapies mi.ht have had a postponing impact on the relative frequency of RBP as ADI.
The US cases of anthrax in 2001 and the recent severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak have heightened the need for preparedness and response to naturally emerging and re-emerging infections or deliberately released biological agents. This report describes the response model of the Istituto Nazionale per le Malattie Infettive Lazzaro Spallanzani (INMI), Rome, Italy for managing patients suspected of or affected by smallpox or viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) either in the context of an intentional release or natural occurrence. The INMI is Italy's leading hospital in its preparedness and response plan to bioterrorism-related infectious agents. All single and double rooms of INMI are equipped with negative air pressure, sealed doors, high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and a fully-equipped anteroom; moreover, a dedicated high isolation unit with a laboratory next door for the initial diagnostic assays is available for admission of sporadic patients requiring high isolation. For patient transportation, two fully equipped ambulances and two stretcher isolators with a negative pressure section are available. Biomolecular and traditional diagnostic assays are currently performed in the biosafety level 3/4 (BSL 3/4) laboratories. Continuing education and training of hospital staff, consistent application of infection control practices, and availability of adequate personnel protective equipment are additional resources implemented for the care of highly infectious patients and to maintain the readiness of an appropriately trained workforce to handle large scale outbreaks.
Exposure prevention is the primary strategy to reduce the risk of occupational bloodborne pathogen infections in healthcare workers (HCW). HCWs should be made aware of the medicolegal and clinical relevance of reporting an exposure, and have ready access to expert consultants to receive appropriate counselling, treatment and follow-up. Vaccination against hepatitis B virus (HBV), and demonstration of immunisation before employment are strongly recommended. HCWs with postvaccinal anti-HBs levels, 1-2 months after vaccine completion, >or=10 mIU/mL are considered as responders. Responders are protected against HBV infection: booster doses of vaccine or periodic antibody concentration testing are not recommended. Alternative strategies to overcome non-response should be adopted. Isolated anti-HBc positive HCWs should be tested for anti-HBc IgM and HBV-DNA: if negative, anti-HBs response to vaccination can distinguish between infection (anti-HBs >or=50 mUI/ml 30 days after 1st vaccination: anamnestic response) and false positive results(anti-HBs >or=10 mUI/ml 30 days after 3rd vaccination: primary response); true positive subjects have resistance to re-infection. and do not need vaccination The management of an occupational exposure to HBV differs according to the susceptibility of the exposed HCW and the serostatus of the source. When indicated, post-exposure prophylaxis with HBV vaccine, hepatitis B immunoglobulin or both must be started as soon as possible (within 1-7 days). In the absence of prophylaxis against hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection, follow-up management of HCV exposures depends on whether antiviral treatment during the acute phase is chosen. Test the HCW for HCV-Ab at baseline and after 6 months; up to 12 for HIV-HCV co-infected sources. If treatment is recommended, perform ALT (amino alanine transferase) activity at baseline and monthly for 4 months after exposure, and qualitative HCV-RNA when an increase is detected.
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Rapid human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing for the management of occupational exposure of healthcare workers significantly decreased the number of anti-retroviral post-exposure prophylaxis regimens started whilst awaiting HIV test results. The study confirmed an equivalent performance of the rapid test in comparison with HIV enzyme immunoassay, and suggests it is cost-effective. In addition, two other potential benefits emerged: reducing the number of source patients who remain untested and increasing the number of occupational exposures reported.
Antiretroviral prophylaxis (PEP) after occupational exposure to HIV in healthcare workers (HCWs) is used across Europe, but not in a consistent manner. A panel of experts, funded by the European Commission, formulated a set of recommendations. When it has been decided that the characteristics of the exposure indicate the initiation of PEP, PEP should be started as soon as possible; initiation is discouraged after 72 hours. PEP should be initiated routinely with any triple combination of antiretrovirals approved for the treatment of HIV-infected patients; a two class regimen is to be preferred. The source patient's treatment history should be sought. Counselling, psychological support, HIV testing and clinical evaluation should be performed at baseline, at 6-8 weeks, and at least 6 months post exposure. Additional clinical and laboratory monitoring at one and two weeks should be considered, as adherence with and tolerance of the regimen can highlight adverse reactions and potential toxicity. Routine HIV resistance tests in the source patient, and direct virus assays in the exposed HCW are not recommended.
Post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) is the standard of care for a healthcare worker (HCW) accidentally exposed to an HIV infected source person (occupational exposure), but this is not the case for non-occupational exposures. Very few national guidelines exist for the management of non-occupational exposures to HIV in Europe, contrarily to the occupational ones. The administration of non-occupational post-exposure prophylaxis (NONOPEP) for HIV may be justified by: a biological plausibility, the effectiveness of PEP in animal studies and occupational exposures in humans, efficacy in the prevention of mother to child HIV transmission, and cost effectiveness studies. These evidences, the similar risk of HIV transmission for certain non-occupational exposures to occupational ones, and the conflicting information about attitudes and practices among physicians on NONOPEP led to the proposal of these European recommendations. Participant members of the European project on HIV NONOPEP, funded by the European Commission, and acknowledged as experts in bloodborne pathogen transmission and prevention, met from December 2000 to December 2002 at three formal meetings and a two day workshop for a literature review on risk exposure assessment and the development of the European recommendations for the management of HIV NONOPEP. NONOPEP is recommended in unprotected receptive anal sex and needle or syringe exchange when the source person is known as HIV positive or from a population group with high HIV prevalence. Any combination of drugs available for HIV infected patients can be used as PEP and the simplest and least toxic regimens are to be preferred. PEP should be given within 72 hours from the time of exposure, starting as early as possible and lasting four weeks. All patients should receive medical evaluation including HIV antibody tests, drug toxicity monitoring and counseling periodically for at least 6 months after the exposure. NONOPEP seems to be a both feasible and frequent clinical practice in Europe. Recommendations for its management have been achieved by consensus, but some remain controversial, and they should be updated periodically. NONOPEP should never be considered as a primary prevention strategy and the final decision for prescription must be made on the basis of the patient-physician relationship. Finally, a surveillance system for these cases will be useful to monitor NONOPEP practices in Europe.
Our research aimed to describe infectious disease mortality in Italy between 1969 and 1999, with particular emphasis on sex, age, and geographic differences. Using mortality data provided by the Italian Central Institute for Statistics (ISTAT), we evaluated all codes of the ICD8 and ICD9 classifications to identify each cause of death attributable to infectious agents. Deaths for HIV/AIDS were excluded. Infectious diseases accounted for 1.7% of overall mortality between 1969-1999, and our approach identified 57.5% of all deaths from infections not included in the ICD8 and ICD9 infectious disease codes. Up to 1994, the mortality for all infectious diseases showed a very strong downward trend, with a 6-fold decline. This trend levelled off in 1995-1999, mainly due to increasing deaths due to septicaemias, heart infections and hepatitis. An increasing proportion of deaths due to infectious diseases occurred in the elderly, from 48.1% in 1969-1979 to 77.3% in 1990-1999. Mortality rates were consistently higher in men than in women and showed a substantial geographic heterogeneity. In the newborn, mortality rates declined 10-fold and an inverse north-south geographic gradient persisted during the study period. This exhaustive methodological approach to identifying infectious causes of deaths allows us to better define the burden of infections on mortality and register downward trends similar to those found in other industrialized countries.
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The transmission of viral hepatitis from health care workers (HCW) to patients is of worldwide concern. Since the introduction of serologic testing in the 1970s there have been over 45 reports of hepatitis B virus (HBV) transmission from HCW to patients, which have resulted in more than 400 infected patients. In addition there are six published reports of transmissions of hepatitis C virus (HCV) from HCW to patients resulting in the infection of 14 patients. Additional HCV cases are known of in the US and UK, but unpublished. At present the guidelines for preventing HCW to patient transmission of viral hepatitis vary greatly between countries. It was our aim to reach a Europe-wide consensus on this issue. In order to do this, experts in blood-borne infection, from 16 countries, were questioned on their national protocols. The replies given by participating countries formed the basis of a discussion document. This paper was then discussed at a meeting with each of the participating countries in order to reach a Europe-wide consensus on the identification of infected HCWs, protection of susceptible HCWs, management and treatment options for the infected HCW. The results of that process are discussed and recommendations formed. The guidelines produced aim to reduce the risk of transmission from infected HCWs to patients. The document is designed to complement existing guidelines or form the basis for the development of new guidelines. This guidance is applicable to all HCWs who perform EPP, whether newly appointed or already in post.
BACKGROUND: We wanted to determine the incidence of anti-hepatitis C virus (HCV) seroconversion after percutaneous exposure to infectious fluids of an anti-HCV positive source in healthcare workers (HCW) and to investigate related risk factors. PATIENTS AND METHODS: Prospective observation in 55 Italian hospitals of anti-HCV-negative exposed HCW were followed clinically and serologically for at least 6 months. RESULTS: Of 4,403 exposed HCW, 14 seroconverted (0.31%; 95% CI 0.15-0.48) after an injury with a hollow-bore, blood-filled needle (14/1,876=0.74%; 95% CI 0.41-1.25). Deep injuries increased the seroconversion risk (OR 6.53; 95% CI 2.01-20.80). Exposure to an HIV co-infected source was associated with an higher, though not yet statistically significant, risk (OR 2.76, 95% CI 0.49-10.77). Source's HCV viremia was available in 674 cases, 566 of whom tested positive, including the nine seroconversion cases for whom this information was available. CONCLUSION: The risk of acquiring HCV after percutaneous exposure seems to be lower than previously reported. Deep injury, injury with a blood-filled needle and HIV co-infection of source seem to be associated with occupational transmission. Needlestick prevention devices could decrease the risk of infection with HCV and other bloodborne pathogens in HCW.