PubMed Health⌕ Search

Biomedical subjects

Vittorio Gallese

Publications and source records attributed to Vittorio Gallese.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
PubMed2007

Embodied simulation: from mirror neuron systems to interpersonal relations.

A direct form of 'experiential understanding' of others is achieved by modelling their behaviours as intentional experiences on the basis of the equivalence between what the others do and feel and what we do and feel. This modelling mechanism is embodied simulation. By means of embodied simulation we do not just 'see' an action, an emotion, or a sensation. Side by side with the sensory description of the observed social stimuli, internal representations of the body states associated with actions, emotions, and sensations are evoked in the observer, as if he/she would be doing a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation. Mirror neurons are likely the neural correlate of this mechanism. The mirror neuron matching systems map the different intentional relations in a compressed fashion, which is neutral about the specific quality or identity of the agentive/subjective parameter. By means of a shared neural state realized in two different bodies that nevertheless obey to the same functional rules, the 'objectual other' becomes 'another self'.

Animals↗
PubMed2006

Intentional attunement: a neurophysiological perspective on social cognition and its disruption in autism.

A direct form of experiential understanding of others, "intentional attunement", is achieved by modeling their behavior as intentional experiences on the basis of the activation of shared neural systems underpinning what the others do an feel and what we do and feel. This modeling mechanism is embodied simulation. In parallel with the detached sensory description of the observed social stimuli, internal representations of the body states associated with actions, emotions, and sensations are evoked in the observer, as if he/she would be doing a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation. Mirror neuron systems are likely the neural correlate of this mechanism. By means of a shared neural state realized in two different bodies, the "objectual other" becomes "another self". A defective intentional attunement caused by a lack of embodies simulation might cause some of the social impairments of autistic individuals.

Animals↗
PubMed2005

Functional properties of grasping-related neurons in the ventral premotor area F5 of the macaque monkey.

We investigated the motor and visual properties of F5 grasping neurons, using a controlled paradigm that allows the study of the neuronal discharge during both observation and grasping of many different three-dimensional objects with and without visual guidance. All neurons displayed a preference for grasping of an object or a set of objects. The same preference was maintained when grasping was performed in the dark without visual feedback. In addition to the motor-related discharge, about half of the neurons also responded to the presentation of an object or a set of objects, even when a grasping movement was not required. Often the object evoking the strongest activity during grasping also evoked optimal activity during its visual presentation. Hierarchical cluster analysis indicated that the selectivity of both the motor and the visual discharge of the F5 neurons is determined not by the object shape but by the grip posture used to grasp the object. Because the same paradigm has been used to study the properties of hand-grasping neurons in the dorsal premotor area F2, and in the anterior intraparietal area (AIP), a comparison of the functional properties of grasping-related neurons in the three cortical areas (F5, F2, AIP) is addressed for the first time.

Action Potentials↗
PubMed2005

Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system.

Understanding the intentions of others while watching their actions is a fundamental building block of social behavior. The neural and functional mechanisms underlying this ability are still poorly understood. To investigate these mechanisms we used functional magnetic resonance imaging. Twenty-three subjects watched three kinds of stimuli: grasping hand actions without a context, context only (scenes containing objects), and grasping hand actions performed in two different contexts. In the latter condition the context suggested the intention associated with the grasping action (either drinking or cleaning). Actions embedded in contexts, compared with the other two conditions, yielded a significant signal increase in the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent sector of the ventral premotor cortex where hand actions are represented. Thus, premotor mirror neuron areas-areas active during the execution and the observation of an action-previously thought to be involved only in action recognition are actually also involved in understanding the intentions of others. To ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming new goal, and this is an operation that the motor system does automatically.

Adult↗
PubMed2005

Listening to action-related sentences activates fronto-parietal motor circuits.

Observing actions made by others activates the cortical circuits responsible for the planning and execution of those same actions. This observation-execution matching system (mirror-neuron system) is thought to play an important role in the understanding of actions made by others. In an fMRI experiment, we tested whether this system also becomes active during the processing of action-related sentences. Participants listened to sentences describing actions performed with the mouth, the hand, or the leg. Abstract sentences of comparable syntactic structure were used as control stimuli. The results showed that listening to action-related sentences activates a left fronto-parieto-temporal network that includes the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (Broca's area), those sectors of the premotor cortex where the actions described are motorically coded, as well as the inferior parietal lobule, the intraparietal sulcus, and the posterior middle temporal gyrus. These data provide the first direct evidence that listening to sentences that describe actions engages the visuomotor circuits which subserve action execution and observation.

Acoustic Stimulation↗
PubMed2004

Functional properties of grasping-related neurons in the dorsal premotor area F2 of the macaque monkey.

We investigated the properties of neurons located in the distal forelimb field of dorsal premotor area F2 of macaque monkey using a behavioral paradigm for studying the neuronal discharge during observation (object fixation condition) and grasping of different 3-dimensional objects with and without visual guidance of the movement (movement in light and movement in dark conditions, respectively). The main result is that almost all studied neurons were selective for both the type of prehension and the wrist orientation required for grasping an object. Three categories of neurons were found: purely motor, visually modulated, and visuomotor neurons. The discharge of purely motor neurons was not affected by either object presentation or by the visual feedback of the hand approaching to and interacting with the object. Visually modulated neurons presented a different discharge in the 2 movement conditions, this determining a decrease in selectivity for the grip and wrist orientation in the movement in dark condition. Visuomotor neurons typically discharged during the object fixation task even in the absence of any grasping movement. Nine of them also displayed a different discharge rate between the 2 movement conditions. Congruence was observed between the neuron response during the most effective type of prehension and the neuron response during observation of the object requiring that particular prehension. These results indicate an important role of F2 in the control of goal-related hand movements.

Animals↗
PubMed2004

A touching sight: SII/PV activation during the observation and experience of touch.

Watching the movie scene in which a tarantula crawls on James Bond's chest can make us literally shiver--as if the spider crawled on our own chest. What neural mechanisms are responsible for this "tactile empathy"? The observation of the actions of others activates the premotor cortex normally involved in the execution of the same actions. If a similar mechanism applies to the sight of touch, movies depicting touch should automatically activate the somatosensory cortex of the observer. Here we found using fMRI that the secondary but not the primary somatosensory cortex is activated both when the participants were touched and when they observed someone or something else getting touched by objects. The neural mechanisms enabling our own sensation of touch may therefore be a window also to our understanding of touch.

Adult↗
PubMed2004

A unifying view of the basis of social cognition.

In this article we provide a unifying neural hypothesis on how individuals understand the actions and emotions of others. Our main claim is that the fundamental mechanism at the basis of the experiential understanding of others' actions is the activation of the mirror neuron system. A similar mechanism, but involving the activation of viscero-motor centers, underlies the experiential understanding of the emotions of others.

Affect↗
PubMed2003

Both of us disgusted in My insula: the common neural basis of seeing and feeling disgust.

What neural mechanism underlies the capacity to understand the emotions of others? Does this mechanism involve brain areas normally involved in experiencing the same emotion? We performed an fMRI study in which participants inhaled odorants producing a strong feeling of disgust. The same participants observed video clips showing the emotional facial expression of disgust. Observing such faces and feeling disgust activated the same sites in the anterior insula and to a lesser extent in the anterior cingulate cortex. Thus, as observing hand actions activates the observer's motor representation of that action, observing an emotion activates the neural representation of that emotion. This finding provides a unifying mechanism for understanding the behaviors of others.

Adult↗
PubMed2003

A neuroscientific grasp of concepts: from control to representation.

Abstraction denotes the cognitive process by means of which general concepts are formed. The dominant view of abstraction considers it not only as a complex and sophisticated cognitive activity, but also as a distinctive hallmark of mankind. The distinctiveness of abstract thought has indeed been closely related to another feature peculiar to our species: language. Following this perspective, the possibility to entertain conceptual representations is thus precluded to animals devoid of full-blown language. I challenge this view and propose that the representational dynamic of the brain is conceivable as a type of self-organization, in which action plays a crucial part. My aim will be to investigate whether, and to what extent, conceptual knowledge can be attributed to non-linguistic animal species, with particular emphasis on nonhuman primates. I therefore introduce the notion of semantic content as a type of 'relational specification'. A review of recent neurophysiological data on the neural underpinnings of action end-states in the macaque monkey brain is presented. On the basis of this evidence, I propose that conceptual representations can be conceived as the expression of a coherent internal world model. This model decomposes the 'outer' space inhabited by things in a meaningful way only to the extent that it accords to biologically constrained, embodied invariance. Finally, I discuss how the 'comparative' neuroscientific approach to abstraction proposed here may shed some light on its nature and its evolutionary origin.

Animals↗
PubMed2003

The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: the quest for a common mechanism.

It has been proposed that the capacity to code the 'like me' analogy between self and others constitutes a basic prerequisite and a starting point for social cognition. It is by means of this self/other equivalence that meaningful social bonds can be established, that we can recognize others as similar to us, and that imitation can take place. In this article I discuss recent neurophysiological and brain imaging data on monkeys and humans, showing that the 'like me' analogy may rest upon a series of 'mirror-matching' mechanisms. A new conceptual tool able to capture the richness of the experiences we share with others is introduced: the shared manifold of intersubjectivity. I propose that all kinds of interpersonal relations (imitation, empathy and the attribution of intentions) depend, at a basic level, on the constitution of a shared manifold space. This shared space is functionally characterized by automatic, unconscious embodied simulation routines.

Cognition↗
PubMed2003

The emergence of a shared action ontology: building blocks for a theory.

To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions about the structure of reality, which at the same time shape the causal profile of the brain's motor output and its representational deep structure, in particular of the conscious mind arising from it (its "phenomenal output")? How do they constrain high-level phenomena like conscious experience, the emergence of a first-person perspective, or social cognition? By reviewing a series of neuroscientific results and integrating them with a wider philosophical perspective, we will emphasize the contribution the motor system makes to this process. As it will be shown, the motor system constructs goals, actions, and intending selves as basic constituents of the world it interprets. It does so by assigning a single, unified causal role to them. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the brain models movements and action goals in terms of multimodal representations of organism-object-relations. Under a representationalist analysis, this process can be conceived of as an internal, dynamic representation of the intentionality-relation itself. We will show how such a complex form of representational content, once it is in place, can later function as a functional building block for social cognition and for a more complex, consciously experienced representation of the first-person perspective as well.

Animals↗
PubMed2003

Mirror neurons responding to the observation of ingestive and communicative mouth actions in the monkey ventral premotor cortex.

In the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) of the monkey there are neurons that discharge both when the monkey performs specific motor actions and when it observes another individual performing a similar action (mirror neurons). Previous studies on mirror neurons concerned hand actions. Here, we describe the mirror responses of F5 neurons that motorically code mouth actions. The results showed that about one-third of mouth motor neurons also discharge when the monkey observes another individual performing mouth actions. The majority of these 'mouth mirror neurons' become active during the execution and observation of mouth actions related to ingestive functions such as grasping, sucking or breaking food. Another population of mouth mirror neurons also discharges during the execution of ingestive actions, but the most effective visual stimuli in triggering them are communicative mouth gestures (e.g. lip smacking). Some also fire when the monkey makes communicative gestures. These findings extend the notion of mirror system from hand to mouth action and suggest that area F5, the area considered to be the homologue of human Broca's area, is also involved in communicative functions.

Action Potentials↗
PubMed2003

Somatotopic organization of the lateral part of area F2 (dorsal premotor cortex) of the macaque monkey.

The somatotopy of the lateral part of dorsal premotor area F2 has been studied by means of intracortical microstimulation and single neuron recording. The results show that most of this sector of F2 is excitable with low-intensity currents (3-40 microA) and that intracortical microstimulation evokes forelimb and trunk movements. Both proximal and distal forelimb movements are evoked in similar percentages. The proximal and distal forelimb representations partially overlap. However, proximal movements tend to be located more medially (laterally to the superior precentral dimple), whereas distal movements tend to be located more laterally (medially to the spur of the arcuate sulcus). The somatotopic organization demonstrated with microstimulation is confirmed by the similar somatotopic organization of active movements and of somatosensory properties revealed by single-neuron recording. The excitability and somatotopic organization of the lateral part of area F2 are discussed in relation to previous electrophysiological and anatomical findings. The involvement of the distal forelimb representation of area F2 in programming and controlling reaching to grasp movements is suggested.

Animals↗
PubMed2002

Hearing sounds, understanding actions: action representation in mirror neurons.

Many object-related actions can be recognized by their sound. We found neurons in monkey premotor cortex that discharge when the animal performs a specific action and when it hears the related sound. Most of the neurons also discharge when the monkey observes the same action. These audiovisual mirror neurons code actions independently of whether these actions are performed, heard, or seen. This discovery in the monkey homolog of Broca's area might shed light on the origin of language: audiovisual mirror neurons code abstract contents-the meaning of actions-and have the auditory access typical of human language to these contents.

Acoustic Stimulation↗
PubMed2002

Motor and cognitive functions of the ventral premotor cortex.

Recent data show that the ventral premotor cortex in both humans and monkeys has motor and cognitive functions. The cognitive functions include space perception, action understanding and imitation. The data also show a clear functional homology between monkey area F5 and human area 44. Preliminary evidence suggests that the ventral part of the lateral premotor cortex in humans may correspond to monkey area F4. A tentative map of the human lateral premotor areas founded on the reviewed evidence is presented.

Anatomy, Comparative↗