Complete retrograde dysmnesia.
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Accidents↗
Biomedical subjects
W B Runciman
Publications and source records attributed to W B Runciman.
Comparative disposition of morphine-3-glucuronide during separate intravenous infusions of morphine and morphine-3-glucuronide in sheep. Importance of the kidney.
The disposition of morphine-3-glucuronide (M3G) in sheep was compared during separate constant infusions of morphine and M3G. Five ewes received a 15-min loading dose, followed by a constant infusion of morphine sulfate (10 mg/hr) or M3G (4 mg/hr for 4 sheep, 7.5 mg/hr for 1 sheep) for a further 5.75 hr. During the 5th-6th hr of infusion, blood was collected simultaneously from the aorta, pulmonary artery, hepatic vein, hepatic portal vein, renal vein, and posterior vena cava. Additional samples were collected from the aorta from 0 to 5 hr and from 6 to 48 hr. Urine was collected via an indwelling catheter from 0 to 6 hr, with further free-flowing urine up to 48 hr. An HPLC assay was used to determine simultaneously morphine, M3G, and morphine-6-glucuronide (M6G) in plasma and urine. Constant concentrations of morphine, M3G, and M6G in plasma were achieved during the 5- to 6-hr period of infusion with morphine, as were the concentrations of M3G while M3G was infused. Regional net extraction ratios and total and regional clearances were calculated during the 5- to 6-hr period. After the infusions were ceased, there was prolonged elimination of M3G formed in situ from morphine compared to when infused as M3G. No morphine or M6G was detected in the plasma during and after infusion with M3G, nor were they found in urine collected up to 6 hr.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)
Animals↗
International standards for safety in the intensive care unit. Developed by the International Task Force on Safety in the Intensive Care Unit.
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Critical Care↗
IV bolus administration of subconvulsive doses of lignocaine to conscious sheep: myocardial pharmacokinetics.
Mass balance principles were used to study the myocardial pharmacokinetics of lignocaine in conscious sheep. After i.v. bolus doses of lignocaine 50, 75 or 100 mg, arterial lignocaine concentrations reached a peak in approximately 16 s and these increased linearly with dose. Coronary sinus concentrations reached a peak between 83 and 129 s and the values showed poor relationships with dose. Net myocardial lignocaine uptake lasted for approximately 60 s--this was much shorter than the reported initial distribution half-life of lignocaine. The maximum rate of uptake was proportional to both the dose and the peak arterial lignocaine concentrations. At 15 min, the myocardial lignocaine concentrations were 46 (SD 22)% of their peak values. Pseudo-equilibrium between blood and myocardial lignocaine concentrations was not observed. It is concluded that, despite the myocardium being very well perfused, lignocaine myocardial concentrations were not well represented by blood lignocaine concentrations for at least 15 min. A greater understanding of the determinants of myocardial drug concentrations is required.
Animals↗
IV bolus administration of subconvulsive doses of lignocaine to conscious sheep: relationships between myocardial pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics.
We have studied relationships between the time-courses of lignocaine concentrations in arterial and coronary sinus blood and myocardial tissue, and negative inotropic effects on the myocardium, after i.v. bolus administration of 50-, 75- or 100-mg doses of lignocaine to conscious, chronically instrumented sheep. Peak arterial and coronary sinus blood lignocaine concentrations occurred 26-38 s before and 29-78 s after the maximum decreases in myocardial contractility, respectively. Peak myocardial concentrations occurred simultaneously with the maximum decreases in myocardial contractility, except for the 100-mg doses. Anti-clockwise hysteresis occurred only between arterial blood lignocaine concentrations and the negative inotropic effect. It was concluded that, after short-term i.v. administration, only the myocardial concentrations of lignocaine were in pseudoequilibrium with the negative inotropic effects of the lignocaine on the myocardium.
Animals↗
Postoperative pain management: an evolving story.
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Analgesia↗
Symposium--The Australian Incident Monitoring Study.
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Accidents↗
The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Errors, incidents and accidents in anaesthetic practice.
Human error is a pervasive and normal part of everyday life and is of interest to the anaesthetist because errors may lead to accidents. Definitions of, and the relationships between, errors, incidents and accidents are provided as the basis to this introduction to the psychology of human error in the context of the work of the anaesthetist. Examples are drawn from the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS). An argument is put forward for the use of contemporaneous incident reporting (eliciting relevant contextual information as well as details of use to cognitive psychologists), rather than the use of accident investigation after the event (with the inherent problems of scant information, altered perception and outcome bias). A classification of errors is provided. "Active" errors may be classified into knowledge-based, rule-based, skill-based and technical errors. Different strategies are required for the prevention of each type and it may now be useful to place more emphasis in anaesthetic practice on categories to which little attention has been directed in the past. "Latent" errors make an enormous contribution to problems in anaesthesia and several categories are discussed (e.g. environment, physiological state, equipment, work practices, personnel training, social and cultural factors). An approach is provided for the prevention and management of errors, incidents and accidents which allows clinical problems to be categorized, the relative importance of various contributing factors to be established, and appropriate preventative strategies to be devised and implemented on the basis of priorities determined from the AIMS data. Accidents cannot be abolished; however, an understanding of the factors underlying them can lead to the rational direction of resources and effort to prevent them and minimise their effects.
Accident Prevention↗
The Australian Incident Monitoring Study: an analysis of 2000 incident reports.
The Australian Patient Safety Foundation was formed in 1987; it was decided to set up and co-ordinate the Australian Incident Monitoring Study as a function of this Foundation; 90 hospitals and practices joined the study. Participating anaesthetists were invited to report, on an anonymous and voluntary basis, any unintended incident which reduced, or could have reduced, the safety margin for a patient. Any incident could be reported, not only those which were deemed "preventable" or were thought to involve human error. The Mark I AIMS form was developed which incorporated features and concepts from several other studies. All the incidents in this symposium were reported using this form, which contains general instructions to the reporter, key words and space for a narrative of the incident, structured sections for what happened (with subsections for circuitry incidents, circuitry involved, equipment involved, pharmacological incidents and airway incidents), why it happened (with subsections for factors contributing to the incident, factors minimising the incident and suggested corrective strategies), the type of anaesthesia and procedure, monitors in use, when and where the incident happened, the experience of the personnel involved, patient age and a classification of patient outcome. Enrollment, reporting and data-handling procedures are described. Data on patient outcome are presented; this is correlated with the stages at which the incident occurred and with the ASA status of the patients. The locations at which the incidents occurred and the types of procedures, the sets of incidents analysed in detail and a breakdown of the incidents due to drugs are also presented.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)
Accidents↗
The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Which monitor? An analysis of 2000 incident reports.
The role of monitors in patients undergoing general anaesthesia was studied by analysing the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study; 1256 (63%) were considered applicable to this study. In 52% of these a monitor detected the incident first; oximetry (27%) and capnography (24%) detected over half of the monitor detected incidents, the electrocardiograph 19%, blood pressure monitors 12%, a low pressure (circuit) alarm 8%, and the oxygen analyser 4%. Of the other monitors used, 5 first detected 1-2% of incidents, and the remaining 8 less than 0.5% each. The oximeter would have detected over 40% of the monitor detected incidents had its more informative modulated pulse tone always been relied upon instead of the "bleep" of the ECG. A theoretical analysis was then carried out to determine which of an array of 17 monitors would reliably have detected each incident had each monitor been used on its own and had the incident been allowed to evolve. To facilitate "scoring" of monitors, the incidents were categorized empirically into 60 clinical situations; 40% of applicable incidents were accounted for by only 5 clinical situations, 60% by 10 and nearly 80% by 20. 98% were accounted for by the 60 situations. A pulse oximeter, used on its own, would theoretically have detected 82% of applicable incidents (nearly 60% before any potential for organ damage). These figures for capnography are 55% and 43% and for oximetry and capnography combined are 88% and 65%, respectively. With the addition of blood pressure monitoring these become 93% and 65%, and of an oxygen analyser, 95 and 67%. Other monitors, including the ECG, each increase the yield by by less than 0.5%. The international monitoring recommendations and those of the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists are thoroughly vindicated by the patterns revealed in this study. The priority sequence of monitor acquisition for those with limited resources should be stethoscope, sphygmomanometer, oxygen analyser if nitrous oxide is to be used, pulse oximeter, capnograph, high pressure alarm, and, if patients are to be mechanically ventilated, a low pressure alarm (or spirometer with alarm); an ECG, a defibrillator, a spirometer and a thermometer should be available.
Accidents↗
The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. The pulse oximeter: applications and limitations--an analysis of 2000 incident reports.
The first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study were analysed with respect to the role of the pulse oximeter. Of these 184 (9%) were first detected by a pulse oximeter and there were a further 177 (9%) in which desaturation was recorded. Of the 1256 incidents which occurred in association with general anaesthesia 48% were "human detected" and 52% "monitor detected". The pulse oximeter was ranked first and detected 27% of these monitor detected incidents; this figure would have been over 40% if an oximeter had always been used and its more informative modulated pulse tone relied upon instead of that of the "bleep" of the ECG. The pulse oximeter is the "front-line" monitor for endobronchial intubation, the fourth most common incident in association with general anaesthesia (it detected 87% of the 76 cases in which it was in use). It also played an invaluable role as a "back-up" monitor in 40 life-threatening situations in which "front-line" monitors (e.g. oxygen analyser, low pressure alarm, capnograph) were either not in use, were being used incorrectly or failed. Other situations detected, in order of frequency of detection, were: circuit disconnection, circuit leak, desaturation (severe shunt), oesophageal intubation, aspiration and/or regurgitation, pulmonary oedema, endotracheal tube obstruction, severe hypotension, failure of oxygen delivery, hypoxic gas mixture, hypoventilation, anaphylaxis, air embolism, bronchospasm, malignant hyperthermia, and tension pneumothorax.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)
Accidents↗
The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. The oxygen analyser: applications and limitations--an analysis of 200 incident reports.
The first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian INcident Monitoring Study were analysed with respect to the role of the oxygen analyser; 27 (1%) were first detected by the oxygen analyser. All of these were amongst the 1256 incidents which occurred in association with general anaesthesia, of which 48% were "human detected" and 52% "monitor detected". The oxygen analyser was ranked 7th and detected 4% of these monitor detected incidents. This figure would have been much higher had the oxygen analyser been correctly used on more occasions. The oxygen analyser detected 10 ventilator-driving-gas leaks into the circuit, 6 hypoxic mixtures due to rotameter settings, 3 inappropriate nitrous oxide concentrations, 2 disconnections and 1 leak at the common gas outlet, and 2 partial and 1 total failure of ventilation. In a theoretical analysis of these 1256 incidents it was considered that the oxygen analyser, used on its own, would have detected 114 (9%), had they been allowed to evolve (3% before any potential for organ damage). In 4 incidents an oxygen analyser gave faulty readings, in 3 caused a leak and in one a total circuit obstruction; 5 incidents were not detected because the alarm had been disabled. Despite the advent of piped gas supplies, failure of gas delivery or delivery of a "wrong" gas mixture still occurs surprisingly frequently in current anaesthetic practice; hypoxic mixtures were supplied on 16 occasions, other "wrong" mixtures on 23 and the oxygen supply failed on 7 occasions.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)
Accidents↗
The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Crisis management--validation of an algorithm by analysis of 2000 incident reports.
Anaesthetists are called upon to manage complex life-threatening crises at a moment's notice. As there is evidence that this may require cognitive tasking beyond the information-processing capacity of the human brain, it was decided to try and develop a generic crisis management algorithm analogous to the "Phase I" immediate response routine used by airline pilots. Such an algorithm, based on the mnemonic "COVER ABCD, A SWIFT CHECK", was developed and refined over 3 meetings, each attended by 60-100 anaesthetists and aviation psychologists. It was validated against 1301 relevant incidents among the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study. It proved sufficiently robust and safe to recommend its general use as an initial response to any incident or crisis which occurs when a patient is breathing gas from an anesthetic machine. It requires a limited knowledge base and is easily learnt and rehearsed during the anaesthetist's working day. It will provide a functional diagnosis in over 99% of cases and will correct 62% of the problems in 40-60 seconds. In the remaining 37% it will allow the anaesthetist to proceed with a "sub-algorithm", confident in the knowledge that some important step has not been missed. In just over 30% of incidents this will be for a problem familiar to all anaesthetists (e.g. laryngospasm, bradycardia); in just over 6% it will be for a less common, more complex, but finite, set of problems (3% cardiac arrest, 1% air embolism, 1% anaphylaxis, 1% for the remaining desaturations); in less than 1% diagnosis and correction will require a more complex checklist (e.g. for malignant hyperthermia, pneumothorax). The next stage, the development of specific sub-algorithms and a structured team approach for ongoing problems, is in progress.
Algorithms↗
The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. The "wrong drug" problem in anaesthesia: an analysis of 2000 incident reports.
Amongst the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study, there were 144 incidents in which the "wrong drug" was nearly or actually administered to a patient. Thirty-three percent of the incidents involved ampoules and just over 40% syringes; in over half of the latter the syringes were of the same size, and also, in over half, they were correctly labelled. In 81% of the 144 incidents the "wrong drug" was actually given. This was more common with syringes (93%) than ampoules (58%). Thus the most common error was actually giving the wrong drug from a correctly labelled syringe. The most common drug involved was a muscle relaxant in both ampoule and syringe incidents. In 74% of all reports, there was the potential for serious harm to the patient; however no deaths were reported. Factors which contributed significantly to the incidents were similar appearance, inattention and haste. "Failure of communication" was a significant factor in syringe incidents when two or more staff were involved. The only significant factor which minimised the outcome was rechecking of the syringe or drug ampoule before giving the drug. Strategies suggested to address the "wrong drug" problem include education of staff about the nature of the problem and the mechanisms involved; colour coding of selected drug classes for both ampoules and syringes; the use of standardised drug storage, layout and selection protocols; having a drawing up and labelling convention; and the use of checking protocols.
Anesthesia↗
The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Oesophageal intubation: an analysis of 2000 incident reports.
There were 35 oesophageal intubations in the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS). These reports confirm existing impressions that misplacement of the endotracheal tube can occur in trained as well as untrained hands, and that auscultation is an unreliable test. On the other hand, the value of capnography is emphasised, with no false positives in the 16 cases in which the instrument was used. There was one false negative. Over the 4 years of the AIMS study, reports have declined in frequency. It is possible that the early detection of oesophageal intubation by capnography has altered its status to the extent that anaesthetists no longer regard it as a "critical" incident. It is highly recommended that the presence of the expected concentration of carbon dioxide in expired air be confirmed by capnography immediately after any endotracheal intubation.
Accidents↗
The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Problems with ventilation: an analysis of 2000 incident reports.
A review of the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study found 317 incidents which involved problems with ventilation. The major portion (47%) were disconnections; 61% of these were detected by a monitor. Monitor detection was by a low circuit pressure alarm in 37% but this alarm failed to warn of non-ventilation in 12 incidents (in 6 because it was not switched "on" and in 6 because of a failure to detect the disconnection). Failure of detection was usually with ventilator bellows descending in expiration. Complete failure to ventilate occurred in 143 incidents, most commonly because of a disconnection. Disconnection was associated, in one-third of the cases, with interference to the anaesthetic circuit by a third party and in nearly half with surgery on the head and neck. Leaks affected ventilation in 129 incidents, but in only 19 was ventilation totally lost; leaks associated with seal failure of the absorber were common. Misconnections occurred in 36 incidents, most commonly involving the scavenging system. The frequency of a complete failure to check an anaesthetic machine was greater when an induction room was involved than when only the operating theatre was the site of the incident. These incidents suggest that meticulous checking and monitoring for failure of ventilation, preferably using at least two separate, self-activating systems is highly desirable. The Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists' policy on low circuit pressure alarms, oximetry and capnography is vindicated by these reports.
Accidents↗
The Australian Incident Monitoring Study. Air embolism--an analysis of 2000 incident reports.
There were 19 cases of air embolism (1%) among the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study. No embolism-induced fatalities were reported. Serious acute systemic effects occurred in 14 incidents; one circulatory arrest required electrical counter-shock. The surgical field was the entry route for the air in 63% of the incidents; 47% of the cases occurred during head and neck surgery. Capnography was the most successful first detector (26%) and it confirmed the diagnosis in another 26%. Invasive blood pressure monitoring, the electrocardiograph and the pulse oximeter played a useful role in detecting and/or confirming air embolism. Doppler monitoring was not reported in this series. A successful first response for management included head-down posture, manual ventilation, 100% oxygen and control of the air entry site. Cerebral arterial gas embolism may induce vascular endothelial damage and possible delayed neurological sequelae; hyperbaric oxygen therapy should be considered.
Anesthesia↗