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Dispersal and Inbreeding Avoidance.

Abstract

Using a game-theoretical approach, we investigate the dispersal patterns expected if inbreeding avoidance were the only reason for dispersal. The evolutionary outcome is always complete philopatry by one sex. The rate of dispersal by the other sex depends on patch size and mating system, as well as inbreeding and dispersal costs. If such costs are sex independent, then two stable equilibria coexist (male or female philopatry), with symmetric domains of attraction. Which sex disperses is determined entirely by history, genetic drift, and gene flow. An asymmetry in costs makes one domain of attraction extend at the expense of the other. In such a case, the dispersing sex might also be, paradoxically, the one that incurs the higher dispersal costs. As asymmetry increases, one equilibrium eventually disappears, which may result in a sudden evolutionary shift in the identity of the dispersing sex. Our results underline the necessity to control for phylogenetic relationships (e.g., through the use of independent-comparisons methods) when investigating empirical trends in dispersal. Our model also makes quantitative predictions on the rate of dispersal by the dispersing sex and suggests that inbreeding avoidance may only rarely be the sole reason for dispersal.

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BibTeXRIS

Nicolas Perrin, Vladimir Mazalov. 1999. Dispersal and Inbreeding Avoidance.. https://doi.org/10.1086/303236

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Optimal Floating and Queuing Strategies: The Logic of Territory Choice.

This is a response to a recent article by Hanna Kokko and William J. Sutherland (American Naturalist 152:354-366), who consider evolutionarily stable territory acceptance rules for animals that face the decision between settling on a poor territory now (which is then retained for life) or waiting for better habitat to become available later (taking a chance of dying before reproducing). In contrast to these authors, we argue that the evolutionarily stable threshold quality above which territories are acceptable does depend on whether individuals compete for a single territory (queuing) or for multiple territories (floating) and also on whether access to territories is determined by a hierarchy among waiting individuals. More specifically, we show the following: First, if the choice is between floating and settling, the evolutionarily stable acceptance threshold is such that threshold territories yield an expected lifetime reproductive success (LRS) of [Formula: see text], the survival probability of a floater. Second, if the choice is between queuing and settling, the evolutionarily stable threshold may correspond to any LRS between [Formula: see text] and unity. Third, the number of nonbreeding individuals in the population is maximized at a threshold of unity. In other words, the evolutionarily stable threshold does not maximize the nonbreeding fraction of the population. We argue that models of territory choice should carefully specify the mechanism of choice because some choice processes (e.g., indiscriminate habitat use above the threshold) do not admit an evolutionarily stable acceptance rule.

evolutionarily stable strategy↗