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PubMed · 11187407

What do you know?

J Flower·P Guillaume
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Abstract

If you run an organization, what do you know? What could you know? What is obvious--what we take for granted--hides deeper, contradictory realities. Such simple assumptions as "The goal of management is to get things done by motivating people to do them" not only hide a deeper truth, they keep us from getting to what's true. There is no short road to leadership. It is long-term. It is about relationship, in the deepest sense. Leaders don't create energy and momentum, they harness the energy and momentum that already exists in the people that they hope to lead. They connect with people, and they get out of the way.

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Cooperative BehaviorLeadershipOrganizational ObjectivesUnited StatesJournal Article

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J Flower, P Guillaume. What do you know?. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11187407/

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