PubMed · 11188023
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2000. Outward bound.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11188023/
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Considerable methodological research has been conducted on handling uncertainty in cost-effectiveness analysis. The current literature suggests the concepts of net health benefits and cost-effectiveness acceptability curves to circumvent the technical shortcomings of cost-effectiveness ratio statistics. However, these approaches do not provide a solution for the inherent problem that the threshold cost-effectiveness ratio itself is unknown. The authors suggest analysing uncertainty in cost-effectiveness analysis by directly addressing the concept of opportunity costs using the decision rule described by Birch and Gafni (1992) and introduce a new graphical framework (the "decision making plane") for communicating with policy makers.
In the early 1990s, DRG based hospital financing was introduced into some hospital districts in Finland. The 1993 state subsidy reform decentralising all hospital financing to municipalities, and the aim of improving productivity, were the driving forces for introducing DRG. This study addresses the pros and cons of DRG in hospital financing in the Finnish health care system and puts forward several solutions to avoid potential problems. We consider the objectives and optimal features of hospital financing systems in the context of the public health care system, where the public sector owns and finances hospitals. We analyse impacts of introducing different types of DRG based hospital financing systems, taking into account earlier experiences in countries such as Sweden and Norway, as well as Finnish system specific features. DRG could assist the Finnish municipalities to compare quality, costs and prices of services between hospitals, and related cost information might help them budget expenditure more accurately. System specific features mean that traditional uses of DRG in hospital pricing are not feasible in Finland. But some benefits of DRG could be exploited, for instance in the controlled contracts between municipalities and hospitals.
The present paper aims at giving a short overview of the organization and financing of the Danish health care system as of 1997-1998 when the SWOT panel evaluated the system. The overview follows the triangular model of a health care system. The Danish system is characterized by being decentralized and single-funded. The hospital sector is public, and hospitals are financed and run by the counties (with only a very small private hospital sector alongside). General practitioners are private entrepreneurs but work under contract for the counties. Hospitals are financed by global budgets, while general practitioners are paid by a mixed remuneration system of capitation fees and fee-for-service. During the past 20 years, the government has repeatedly imposed budget ceilings on the counties which has limited growth in the health care sector.