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PubMed · 11370195

Preparing for expected bioterrorism attacks.

Abstract

The threat of bioterrorism in the United States is increasing. Health professionals, especially "front-line" practitioners, must be able to recognize the potential for major impacts from a bioterrorism event. Although an effective attack could produce numbers of casualties equivalent to those resulting from a nuclear weapon, an unannounced attack would be unlikely to be recognized immediately. Health workers may be the first to recognize an attack. However, only limited assistance is available to aid local community medical organizations in planning for bioterrorism. Military medical personnel have had more experience in planning for terrorist activities than many of their civilian colleagues. Their experience may be invaluable to local civilian treatment facilities in developing practical plans to meet the unique aspects of bioterrorism. In addition to considering agent-specific medical problems and requirements, it is particularly important for plans to address command and control, communication, and coordination if the resultant response is to be effective.

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BibTeXRIS

R Moser, G L White, C R Lewis-Younger, L C Garrett. 2001. Preparing for expected bioterrorism attacks.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11370195/

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