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PubMed · 11447892

Examining maintenance responsibilities.

Abstract

This paper has examined the important responsibilities of the two organisations involved in the provision of maintenance service for the vital building services in many of our highly serviced buildings. The issues raised could be put to beneficial use in both clients and maintenance providers. All in all, the clients should work closely with their maintenance providers. Engineering services in buildings will not perform satisfactorily and efficiently if both parties do not work together and understand the maintenance tasks based on a business partnering mode. Put forward is the view that the management of the activities involved in the operation and maintenance process is a "shared commitment/involvement" between the client and the maintenance provider. It is obvious that many factors can influence the continued effectiveness of a quality maintenance scheme set up by client and provider. Some of these factors are: Change in key personnel Updates in technology Amendments to engineering practice Implementation of legislative requirements Changes in operation by client or provider Change of use of building Passage of time These factors must be fully reviewed by both parties from time to time, and necessary actions taken. A cooperative team working relationship and improved communication should be fostered by the client and his provider for the best management of services maintenance. This arrangement will contribute to better building services systems with continuous improvement; improved value for clients and higher return for the maintenance provider.

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BibTeXRIS

K C Lam. 2001. Examining maintenance responsibilities.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11447892/

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