PubMed · 11631447
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Y Knibiehler. 1979. [Not Available].. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11631447/
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The SIR (susceptible-infectious-resistant) and SIS (susceptible-infectious-susceptible) frameworks for infectious disease have been extensively studied and successfully applied. They implicitly assume the upper and lower limits of the range of possibilities for host immune response. However, the majority of infections do not fall into either of these extreme categories. We combine two general avenues that straddle this range: temporary immune protection (immunity wanes over time since infection), and partial immune protection (immunity is not fully protective but reduces the risk of reinfection). We present a systematic analysis of the dynamics and equilibrium properties of these models in comparison to SIR and SIS, and analyse the outcome of vaccination programmes. We describe how the waning of immunity shortens inter-epidemic periods, and poses major difficulties to disease eradication. We identify a "reinfection threshold" in transmission when partial immunity is included. Below the reinfection threshold primary infection dominates, levels of infection are low, and vaccination is highly effective (approximately an SIR model). Above the reinfection threshold reinfection dominates, levels of infection are high, and vaccination fails to protect (approximately an SIS situation). This association between high prevalence of infection and vaccine failure emphasizes the problems of controlling recurrent infections in high-burden regions. However, vaccines that induce a better protection than natural infection have the potential to increase the reinfection threshold, and therefore constitute interventions with a surprisingly high capacity to reduce infection where reduction is most needed.
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BACKGROUND: Toronto was the site of North America's largest outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). An understanding of the patterns of transmission and the effects on public health in relation to control measures that were taken will help health officials prepare for any future outbreaks. METHODS: We analyzed SARS case, quarantine, and hotline records in relation to control measures. The two phases of the outbreak were compared. RESULTS: Toronto Public Health investigated 2132 potential cases of SARS, identified 23,103 contacts of SARS patients as requiring quarantine, and logged 316,615 calls on its SARS hotline. In Toronto, 225 residents met the case definition of SARS, and all but 3 travel-related cases were linked to the index patient, from Hong Kong. SARS spread to 11 (58 percent) of Toronto's acute care hospitals. Unrecognized SARS among in-patients with underlying illness caused a resurgence, or a second phase, of the outbreak, which was finally controlled through active surveillance of hospitalized patients. In response to the control measures of Toronto Public Health, the number of persons who were exposed to SARS in nonhospital and nonhousehold settings dropped from 20 (13 percent) before the control measures were instituted (phase 1) to 0 afterward (phase 2). The number of patients who were exposed while in a hospital ward rose from 25 (17 percent) in phase 1 to 68 (88 percent) in phase 2, and the number exposed while in the intensive care unit dropped from 13 (9 percent) in phase 1 to 0 in phase 2. Community spread (the length of the chains of transmission outside of hospital settings) was significantly reduced in phase 2 of the outbreak (P<0.001). CONCLUSIONS: The transmission of SARS in Toronto was limited primarily to hospitals and to households that had had contact with patients. For every case of SARS, health authorities should expect to quarantine up to 100 contacts of the patients and to investigate 8 possible cases. During an outbreak, active in-hospital surveillance for SARS-like illnesses and heightened infection-control measures are essential.