PubMed · 11650344
The source did not provide an abstract. Follow the original record for more information.
Explore connections, maps & timelines
Martyn Evans. 1990. Regulating live transplants.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11650344/
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.
KEEP EXPLORING
We present agent-based simulations of a model of a deme-structured population in which group differences in social institutions are culturally transmitted and individual behaviors are genetically transmitted. We use a standard extended fitness accounting framework to identify the parameter space for which this co-evolutionary process generates high levels of group-beneficial behaviors. We show that intergroup conflicts may explain the evolutionary success of both: (a) altruistic forms of human sociality towards unrelated members of one's group; and (b) group-level institutional structures such as food sharing which have emerged and diffused repeatedly in a wide variety of ecologies during the course of human history. Group-beneficial behaviors may evolve if (a) they inflict sufficient fitness costs on outgroup individuals and (b) group-level institutions limit the individual fitness costs of these behaviors and thereby attenuate within-group selection against these behaviors. Thus, the evolutionary success of individually costly but group-beneficial behaviors in the relevant environments during the first 90,000 years of anatomically modern human existence may have been a consequence of distinctive human capacities in social institution building.
Kin selection and reciprocal cooperation provide two candidate explanations for the evolution of cooperation. Models of the evolution of cooperation have typically focussed on one or the other mechanism, despite claims that kin selection could pave the way for the evolution of reciprocal cooperation. We describe a computer simulation model that explicitly supports both kin selection and reciprocal cooperation. The model simulates a viscous population of discrete individuals with social interaction taking the form of the Prisoner's Dilemma and selection acting on performance in these interactions. We recount how the analytical and empirical study of this model led to the conclusion that kin selection may actually inhibit the evolution of effective strategies for establishing reciprocal cooperation.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.