Philosophical conjectures and their refutation.

Abstract

Sir Karl Popper is well known for explicating science in falsificationist terms, for which his degree of corroboration formalism, C(h,e,b), has become little more than a symbol. For example, de Queiroz and Poe in this issue argue that C(h,e,b) reduces to a single relative (conditional) probability, p(e,hb), the likelihood of evidence e, given both hypothesis h and background knowledge b, and in reaching that conclusion, without stating or expressing it, they render Popper a verificationist. The contradiction they impose is easily explained--de Queiroz and Poe fail to take account of the fact that Popper derived C(h,e,b) from absolute (logical) probability and severity of test, S(e,h,b), where critical evidence, p(e,b), is fundamental. Thus, de Queiroz and Poe's conjecture that p(e,hb) = C(h,e,b) is refuted. Falsificationism, not verificationism, remains a fair description of the parsimony method of inference used in phylogenetic systematics, not withstanding de Queiroz and Poe's mistaken understanding that "statistical" probability justifies that method. Although de Queiroz and Poe assert that maximum likelihood has the power "to explain data", they do not successfully demonstrate how causal explanation is achieved or what it is that is being explained. This is not surprising, bearing in mind that what is assumed about character evolution in the accompanying likelihood model M cannot then be explained by the results of a maximum likelihood analysis.