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Transsaccadic memory for visual object detail.

Abstract

When we move our eyes around in real-world scenes, we typically have several peripheral previews of an object before we direct our eyes straight at the object. Numerous studies on transsaccadic memory have investigated whether there is any evidence for the integration of peripheral object information acquired presaccadically with foveal object information acquired postsaccadically. We review this evidence to illustrate the currently dominant view that transsaccadic object memory is sparse and contains little visual object detail. However, based on some recent studies of the role of postsaccadic stimulus blanking in transsaccadic change detection, we hypothesize that transsaccadic object memory involves the automatic emergence of a visual analog: a high-capacity, non-selective, internal representation of visual object detail. This hypothesis is tested by examining cued detection of intrasaccadic changes in the in-depth orientation of objects in scenes. The data provide preliminary support for the presence of the visual analog, but also show that its functionality is strictly limited by attentional and temporal constraints on the process of reading out information from the visual analog.

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BibTeXRIS

Peter De Graef, Karl Verfaillie. 2002. Transsaccadic memory for visual object detail.. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0079-6123(02)40050-7

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