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PubMed · 12602192

You get what you pay for. Case example: designing a quality incentive program.

Debbie Welle-Powell
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Abstract

The author describes her experience in developing a quality incentive program with a national health plan. The ultimate goals: To save lives and money, and reward providers who do the right thing.

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Group PracticeManaged Care ProgramsPhysician Incentive PlansQuality Indicators, Health CareTotal Quality ManagementUnited StatesJournal Article

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Debbie Welle-Powell. 2003. You get what you pay for. Case example: designing a quality incentive program.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12602192/

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