PubMed Health⌕ Search

PubMed · 12664907

Herd behavior in designer genes.

Abstract

The ability of individuals to choose their children's genes has increased over time and may ultimately culminate in a world involving free market reprogenetic technologies. Reprogenetic technologies combine advances in reproductive biology and genetics to provide humans increased control over their children's genes. This Article offers economic perspectives that are helpful in understanding the possibly unexpected ethical, legal, and social issues at stake in using reprogenetic technologies for trait enhancement selection. The Appendix analyzes two competitive games that might arise in such a biotechnological society. Specifically, the Article focuses on herd behavior, caused by either a popularity contest or positional competition, in the choice of genetic traits. The analytical game-theoretic models in the Appendix can have several equilibrium outcomes in terms of individual reprogenetic technological choices and corresponding beliefs about such choices by others. This multiplicity of potential social outcomes suggests that a society can attain efficiency if the state or some private organization transforms individual parents' beliefs over the choices of other parents regarding their children's traits and, thus, coordinates parental reprogenetic decisions by selecting, as focal, certain beliefs over parents' reprogenetic decisions.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

P H Huang. 1999. Herd behavior in designer genes.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12664907/

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related citations

A compensation election for binary social choice.

We report experimental results examining the properties of a bidding mechanism, the "Compensation Election," which is designed to implement a simple binary choice between two options. We may think of the group decision problem as a choice between a new rule and the status quo. The rule and the status quo are each common outcomes that apply across all individuals, but the value or cost that they induce on each individual differs according to each individual's circumstances: some gain, some lose, and others are unaffected by a change to the new from the old. Rather than casting votes, each subject submits a bid reflecting his willingness to pay to induce the group to select one option and the amount he wishes to be paid if the alternative option is selected. The Compensation Election chooses the option that receives the highest sum of bids. We find that, although the Compensation Election allows subjects to strategically bid above their value (or even for the option they do not prefer), such behavior is not the norm. We also find that subjects' bids more truthfully reveal their values when there are more bidders in the election.

Choice Behavior↗

The effects of expanding patient choice of provider on waiting times: evidence from a policy experiment.

Long waiting times for inpatient treatment in the UK National Health Service have been a source of popular and political concern, and therefore a target for policy initiatives. In the London Patient Choice Project, patients at risk of breaching inpatient waiting time targets were offered the choice of an alternative hospital with a guaranteed shorter wait. This paper develops a simple theoretical model of the effect of greater patient choice on waiting times. It then uses a difference in difference econometric methodology to estimate the impact of the London choice project on ophthalmology waiting times. In line with the model predictions, the project led to shorter average waiting times in the London region and a convergence in waiting times amongst London hospitals.

Choice Behavior↗