PubMed Health⌕ Search
Home/Archive/PubMed

PubMed · 12776747

Differential effects of cue changes and task changes on task-set selection costs.

Ulrich Mayr·Reinhold Kliegl
View original source ↗Export metadata ↓

Abstract

A task-switching paradigm with a 2:1 mapping between cues and tasks was used to separate cue-switching processes (indexed through pure cue-switch costs) from actual task-switching processes (indexed through additional costs in case of cue and task changes). A large portion of total switch costs was due to cue changes (Experiments 1 and 2), and cue-switch costs but not task-switch costs were sensitive to effects of practice (Experiment 1) and preparation (Experiment 2). In contrast, task-switch costs were particularly sensitive to response-priming effects (Experiments 1 and 2) and task-set inhibition (Experiment 3). Results suggest two processing stages relevant during task-set selection: cue-driven retrieval of task rules from long-term memory and the automatic application of rules to a particular stimulus situation.

Explore related subjects

Choice BehaviorColor PerceptionCuesDiscrimination, PsychologicalForm PerceptionHumansInhibition, PsychologicalMemoryReaction TimeTime FactorsJournal ArticleResearch Support, Non-U.S. Gov'tResearch Support, U.S. Gov't, P.H.S.

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Ulrich Mayr, Reinhold Kliegl. 2003. Differential effects of cue changes and task changes on task-set selection costs.. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.29.3.362

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related citations

PubMed2007

A compensation election for binary social choice.

We report experimental results examining the properties of a bidding mechanism, the "Compensation Election," which is designed to implement a simple binary choice between two options. We may think of the group decision problem as a choice between a new rule and the status quo. The rule and the status quo are each common outcomes that apply across all individuals, but the value or cost that they induce on each individual differs according to each individual's circumstances: some gain, some lose, and others are unaffected by a change to the new from the old. Rather than casting votes, each subject submits a bid reflecting his willingness to pay to induce the group to select one option and the amount he wishes to be paid if the alternative option is selected. The Compensation Election chooses the option that receives the highest sum of bids. We find that, although the Compensation Election allows subjects to strategically bid above their value (or even for the option they do not prefer), such behavior is not the norm. We also find that subjects' bids more truthfully reveal their values when there are more bidders in the election.

Choice Behavior↗
PubMed2007

The effects of expanding patient choice of provider on waiting times: evidence from a policy experiment.

Long waiting times for inpatient treatment in the UK National Health Service have been a source of popular and political concern, and therefore a target for policy initiatives. In the London Patient Choice Project, patients at risk of breaching inpatient waiting time targets were offered the choice of an alternative hospital with a guaranteed shorter wait. This paper develops a simple theoretical model of the effect of greater patient choice on waiting times. It then uses a difference in difference econometric methodology to estimate the impact of the London choice project on ophthalmology waiting times. In line with the model predictions, the project led to shorter average waiting times in the London region and a convergence in waiting times amongst London hospitals.

Choice Behavior↗