PubMed · 12830637
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Sonya Grypma, Sandra L Jamison. 2003. Caring for strangers.. https://doi.org/10.1097/01.cnj.0000262421.40500.4c
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This article penetrates the relationship between social behavior and rationality. A critical analysis is made of efforts to classify some behaviors as altruistic, as they simultaneously meet criteria of rationality by not truly being self-destructive. Newcomb's paradox is one attempt to create a hybrid behavior that is both irrational and still meets some criterion of rationality. Such dubious rationality is often seen as a source of altruistic behavior. Group selection is a controversial topic. Sober and Wilson (Unto Others--The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998) suggest that a very wide concept of group selection might be used to explain altruism. This concept also includes kin selection and reciprocity, which blurs its focus. The latter mechanisms hardly need further arguments to prove their existence. This article suggests that it is group selection in a strict sense that should be investigated to limit semantic neologism and confusion. In evaluation, the effort to muster a mechanism for altruism out of group selection has not been successful. However, this is not the end to group selection, but rather a good reason to investigate more promising possibilities. There is little reason to burden group selection with the instability of altruism caused by altruistic members of a group having lower fitness than egoistic members. Group selection is much more likely to develop in combination with group egoism. A common project is supported by incitement against free riding, where conformist members joined in solidarity achieve a higher fitness than members pursuing more individualistic options. Group egoism is in no conflict with rationality, and the effects of group selection will be supported rather than threatened by individual selection. Empirical evidence indicates a high level of traits such as conformism and out-group antagonism in line with group egoism. These traits are also likely candidates for behavior favored by group selection since they homogenize the group and link the different individuals closer to one another and a similar fate.
Indirect reciprocity occurs when the cooperative behavior between two individuals is contingent on their previous behavior toward others. Previous theoretical analysis indicates that indirect reciprocity can evolve if individuals use an image-scoring strategy. In this paper, we show that, when errors are added, indirect reciprocity cannot be based on an image-scoring strategy. However, if individuals use a standing strategy, then cooperation through indirect reciprocity is evolutionarily stable. These two strategies differ with respect to the information to which they attend. While image-scoring strategies only need attend to the actions of others, standing strategies also require information about intent. We speculate that this difference may shed light on the evolvability of indirect reciprocity. Additionally, we show that systems of indirect reciprocity are highly sensitive to the availability of information. Finally, we present a model which shows that if indirect reciprocity were to evolve, selection should also favor trusting behavior in relations between strangers.
The complexity of human's cooperative behavior cannot be fully explained by theories of kin selection and group selection. If reciprocal altruism is to provide an explanation for altruistic behavior, it would have to depart from direct reciprocity, which requires dyads of individuals to interact repeatedly. For indirect reciprocity to rationalize cooperation among genetically unrelated or even culturally dissimilar individuals, information about the reputation of individuals must be assessed and propagated in a population. Here, we propose a new framework for the evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: information selectively retrieved from and propagated through dynamically evolving networks of friends and acquaintances. We show that for indirect reciprocity to be evolutionarily stable, the differential probability of trusting and helping a reputable individual over a disreputable individual, at a point in time, must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act. In other words, the benefit received by the trustworthy must out-weigh the cost of helping the untrustworthy.