PubMed · 13758207
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D LAGACHE. [Consciousness and structures].. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/13758207/
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The French psychiatrist Henri Ey developed his organo-dynamic theory of the mind function and consciousness 50 years ago incorporating Hughling Jackson's thinking, along with psychiatric and philosophical theorizations by Janet and Bergson. This model has not received the attention it deserved, but recent advances in neuroscience rekindled interest for Ey's theory. By overcoming the Cartesian mind-body dualism and treating the mind-body unit as an inseparable whole, this model opens the way for the integrated treatment of mental disorders. Ey's conceptualization of consciousness as being simultaneously both synchronous and diachronic anticipates current theories of consciousness (Damasio, Edelman, Mesulam).
The possibility of spectrum inversion has been debated since it was raised by and is still discussed because of its implications for functionalist theories of conscious experience (e.g., Palmer, 1999). This paper provides a mathematical formulation of the question of spectrum inversion and proves that such inversions, and indeed bijective scramblings of color in general, are logically possible. Symmetries in the structure of color space are, for purposes of the proof, irrelevant. The proof entails that conscious experiences are not identical with functional relations. It leaves open the empirical possibility that functional relations might, at least in part, be causally responsible for generating conscious experiences. Functionalists can propose causal accounts that meet the normal standards for scientific theories, including numerical precision and novel prediction; they cannot, however, claim that, because functional relationships and conscious experiences are identical, any attempt to construct such causal theories entails a category error.
A commentary in response to B. Libet: 'The timing of brain events: Reply to the "Special Section" in this journal of September 2004, edited by Susan Pockett' ().