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PubMed · 14199824

AUTOMATISM.

R J MCCALDON
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Abstract

Individuals can carry out complex activity while in a state of impaired consciousness, a condition termed "automatism". Consciousness must be considered from both an organic and a psychological aspect, because impairment of consciousness may occur in both ways. Automatism may be classified as normal (hypnosis), organic (temporal lobe epilepsy), psychogenic (dissociative fugue) or feigned. Often painstaking clinical investigation is necessary to clarify the diagnosis. There is legal precedent for assuming that all crimes must embody both consciousness and will. Jurists are loath to apply this principle without reservation, as this would necessitate acquittal and release of potentially dangerous individuals. However, with the sole exception of the defence of insanity, there is at present no legislation to prohibit release without further investigation of anyone acquitted of a crime on the grounds of "automatism".

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AutomatismClassificationConsciousnessConversion DisorderCrimeDiagnosis, DifferentialDissociative DisordersEpilepsyEpilepsy, Temporal LobeForensic MedicineHumansHypnosisHysteriaMalingeringPhysiologyTemporal LobeAUTOMATISMCLASSIFICATIONCONSCIOUSNESSDIAGNOSIS, DIFFERENTIALDISSOCIATIVE REACTIONEPILEPSY, TEMPORAL LOBEFORENSIC MEDICINEHYPNOSISHYSTERIAMALINGERINGPHYSIOLOGYJournal Article

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R J MCCALDON. 1964-10-24. AUTOMATISM.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/14199824/

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