The truthful signalling hypothesis: an explicit general equilibrium model.

Abstract

In mating competition, the truthful signalling hypothesis (TSH), sometimes known as the handicap principle, asserts that higher-quality males signal while lower-quality males do not (or else emit smaller signals). Also, the signals are "believed", that is, females mate preferentially with higher-signalling males. Our analysis employs specific functional forms to generate analytic solutions and numerical simulations that illuminate the conditions needed to validate the TSH. Analytic innovations include: (1) A Mating Success Function indicates how female mating choices respond to higher and lower signalling levels. (2) A congestion function rules out corner solutions in which females would mate exclusively with higher-quality males. (3) A Malthusian condition determines equilibrium population size as related to per-capita resource availability. Equilibria validating the TSH are achieved over a wide range of parameters, though not universally. For TSH equilibria it is not strictly necessary that the high-quality males have an advantage in terms of lower per-unit signalling costs, but a cost difference in favor of the low-quality males cannot be too great if a TSH equilibrium is to persist. And although the literature has paid less attention to these points, TSH equilibria may also fail if: the quality disparity among males is too great, or the proportion of high-quality males in the population is too large, or if the congestion effect is too weak. Signalling being unprofitable in aggregate, it can take off from a no-signalling equilibrium only if the trait used for signalling is not initially a handicap, but instead is functionally useful at low levels. Selection for this trait sets in motion a bandwagon, whereby the initially useful indicator is pushed by male-male competition into the domain where it does indeed become a handicap.