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PubMed · 15204579

A developmental framework for memory rehabilitation in children.

Abstract

Memory difficulties in adults with acquired brain injuries have been reported in the literature for some time. In recent years, the consequences of memory difficulties from acquired and neurodevelopmental disorders in children have also been investigated. Initial studies have suggested that, like adults, children can experience severe and specific memory deficits. However, there are important developmental differences, both in terms of the nature of cognitive difficulties experienced, and the subsequent consequences for learning, educational attainment and everyday living. Despite the advances made in developmental memory studies, as yet, there appears to be scant literature to guide effective rehabilitation specifically targeted at children. As a starting point, it may be appropriate to consider adaptation of adult rehabilitation strategies to address memory problems in children. This paper describes some of the common principles and practices of adult rehabilitation strategies and then considers the validity of such strategies against developmental models of the memory system and child's learning environment. In particular, four important areas are highlighted: the development of normal memory functions in children, the range of cognitive deficits that can occur in a developing brain, the interaction of memory deficits with other immature cognitive skills and the context of the psycho-social environment in which rehabilitation may take place.

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BibTeXRIS

Ingram Wright, Jenny Limond. A developmental framework for memory rehabilitation in children.. https://doi.org/10.1080/13638490410001668758

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