Cortical midline structures and the self.

Georg Northoff; Felix Bermpohl

doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.01.004

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Cortical midline structures and the self.

Georg Northoff·Felix Bermpohl

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Abstract

For a long time philosophers and psychologists have been intrigued by the question of the self. More recently, this has become a topic of discussion in neuroscience. In this article, we suggest that the processing of self-referential stimuli in cortical midline structures (CMS) is a fundamental component in generating a model of the self. Drawing from neuroimaging studies, we distinguish between representation, monitoring, evaluation and integration of self-referential stimuli. All of these subfunctions are related to distinct regions within the CMS. This relationship between self-referential processing and CMS might provide novel insight into the neural correlates underlying the constitution of the self.

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Georg Northoff, Felix Bermpohl. 2004. Cortical midline structures and the self.. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.01.004

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