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How parallel is visual processing in the ventral pathway?

Guillaume A Rousselet·Simon J Thorpe·Michèle Fabre-Thorpe
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Abstract

Visual object perception is usually studied by presenting one object at a time at the fovea. However, the world around us is composed of multiple objects. The way our visual system deals with this complexity has remained controversial in the literature. Some models claim that the ventral pathway, a set of visual cortical areas responsible for object recognition, can process only one or very few objects at a time without ambiguity. Other models argue in favor of a massively parallel processing of objects in a scene. Recent experiments in monkeys have provided important data about this issue. The ventral pathway seems to be able to perform complex analyses on several objects simultaneously, but only during a short time period. Subsequently only one or very few objects are explicitly selected and consciously perceived. Here, we survey the implications of these new findings for our understanding of object processing.

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ConsciousnessFunctional LateralityHumansNerve NetNeural InhibitionPrefrontal CortexRecognition, PsychologyRetinaSpace PerceptionVisual CortexVisual FieldsVisual PerceptionJournal ArticleResearch Support, Non-U.S. Gov'tReview

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BibTeXRIS

Guillaume A Rousselet, Simon J Thorpe, Michèle Fabre-Thorpe. 2004. How parallel is visual processing in the ventral pathway?. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.06.003

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