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PubMed · 15505521

Is insight in mania state-dependent?: A meta-analysis.

S Nassir Ghaemi·Klara J Rosenquist
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Abstract

In the first meta-analysis of studies assessing insight in mania, we sought to determine whether insight in mania is state-dependent or a trait-like condition. In schizophrenia, insight is a trait-like condition. If state-dependent, insight in mania would differ from insight in schizophrenia, and different treatment and research implications would follow. Seven reports using standardized insight rating scales in mania were identified through a MEDLINE literature search. Four longitudinal studies were included in a meta-analysis. The meta-analysis found that insight appears to be state-dependent. Insight showed a 20% improvement (95% confidence intervals, 7% to 34%) after recovery from acute mania (p = .003). Insight improves in bipolar disorder with resolution of the acute manic episode, suggesting that insight is state-dependent in bipolar disorder. We suggest that impaired insight be considered as part of the diagnostic picture of acute mania.

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AwarenessBipolar DisorderCognitionHealth StatusHumansModels, PsychologicalOutcome Assessment, Health CareJournal ArticleMeta-AnalysisResearch Support, U.S. Gov't, P.H.S.

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S Nassir Ghaemi, Klara J Rosenquist. 2004. Is insight in mania state-dependent?: A meta-analysis.. https://doi.org/10.1097/01.nmd.0000145036.76435.c3

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