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Right spatial neglect after left hemisphere stroke: qualitative and quantitative study.

Abstract

OBJECTIVES: Comparatively little research has been conducted on right neglect after left brain damage. The authors sought to assess contralateral neglect in subacute left hemisphere stroke patients using a comprehensive test battery validated in a large control group after right hemisphere stroke. METHODS: Seventy-eight left hemisphere stroke patients were assessed. The test battery included a preliminary assessment of anosognosia and visual extinction, a clinical assessment of gaze orientation and personal neglect, and paper-and-pencil tests of spatial neglect in the peripersonal space. Only nonverbal tests were used. RESULTS: Drawing and cancellation tasks revealed neglect in 10 to 13% of patients. The combined battery was more sensitive than any single test alone. A total of 43.5% of patients showed some degree of neglect on at least one measure. Anatomic analyses showed that neglect was more common and severe when the posterior association cortex was damaged. CONCLUSIONS: The frequency of occurrence of right neglect was, as expected, much lower than that reported in a study using the same assessment battery in right brain damage stroke patients. Nevertheless, neglect was found in a substantial proportion of patients at a subacute stage, suggesting that it should be considered in the rehabilitation planning of left brain damage stroke patients.

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BibTeXRIS

J-M Beis, C Keller, N Morin, P Bartolomeo, T Bernati, S Chokron, M Leclercq, A Louis-Dreyfus, F Marchal, Y Martin, D Perennou, P Pradat-Diehl, C Prairial, G Rode, M Rousseaux, C Samuel, E Sieroff, L Wiart, P Azouvi, French Collaborative Study Group on Assessment of Unilateral Neglect (GEREN/GRECO). 2004-11-09. Right spatial neglect after left hemisphere stroke: qualitative and quantitative study.. https://doi.org/10.1212/01.wnl.0000142967.60579.32

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