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PubMed · 15768668

On regulation.

Simon Stevens
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Abstract

Control of the tariff system should be handed over to an arms-length technical agency similar to the U.S's Medicare Payments Advisory Commission, according to HSJ columnist and former prime ministerial adviser Simon Stevens. He also warns that the 'understandable decision' to slow implementation of the new system means that the elective tariff 'will be easily gamed'.

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Economic CompetitionGovernment RegulationHealth Care ReformPatient RightsPoliticsReimbursement MechanismsSocial ResponsibilityState MedicineUnited KingdomJournal Article

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Simon Stevens. 2005-02-17. On regulation.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15768668/

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