PubMed · 16005502
Stochastic stability in three-player games.
Abstract
Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only recently were evolutionarily stable strategies defined for multi-player games and their properties analyzed [Broom, M., Cannings, C., Vickers, G.T., 1997. Multi-player matrix games. Bull. Math. Biol. 59, 931-952]. Here we study the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of populations of randomly matched individuals playing symmetric three-player games. We analyze the stochastic stability of equilibria in games with multiple evolutionarily stable strategies. We also show that, in some games, a population may not evolve in the long run to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.
Explore related subjects
Keep this discovery
Explore connections, maps & timelines
Dominik Kamiński, Jacek Miekisz, Marcin Zaborowski. 2005. Stochastic stability in three-player games.. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bulm.2005.01.004
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.