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PubMed · 16419465

[Bioterrorism agents: getting ready for the unthinkable].

Abstract

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S.A. demonstrated our vulnerability to terrorist raids. Furthermore, in the same year inhalational anthrax cases in humans caused by the intentional [corrected] release of Bacillus anthracis spores via the U.S.A. postal system inflicted a lot of panic and terror over the civilian population. The succeeding terrorist events scattered in several other countries are continuous reminders of our frailness [corrected] and of the risk that terrorists attempts in the future may be implemented by means of deliberate evil release of biological agents. These events may be perpetrated by either the release of an infectious agent or any of its products in order to spread death or sickness in humans, animals, or plants with the obnoxius purpose of scaring governments and societies for the profit of particular ideological causes. In the current article, we present a review of the main bioterrorism agents, as well as a historical and clinical aspects and their significance for public health preparedness and response.

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BibTeXRIS

Carlos Franco-Paredes, Alfonso Rodríguez-Morales, José Ignacio Santos-Preciado. [Bioterrorism agents: getting ready for the unthinkable].. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16419465/

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