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A marketing-oriented perspective on physician selection.

Abstract

The process of selecting a physician is an inherently difficult one for patients. Physician selection is often made from limited information, and in many cases, the information used as the basis for physician selection is obtained indirectly through either medical service providers or other consumers or patients. When selecting a physician, patients tend to rely on personal sources of information and place importance on the reputational aspects of the health-care provider, organization, and experience. Patient expectations for the technical aspects of the health-care experience are stringent and must be met or exceeded by physicians and other health-care providers to compete long-term in the health-care market place. Beyond this, health-care providers can favorably influence patient perceptions of the health-care experience by excelling at the functional aspects of service provision (ie, the interpersonal- and process-oriented attributes). This article examines the physician selection process and provides marketing-oriented recommendations for addressing some of the challenges patients encounter when selecting a physician.

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BibTeXRIS

Scott W Kelley, Richard W Schwartz. 2005. A marketing-oriented perspective on physician selection.. https://doi.org/10.1177/155335060501200412

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