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PubMed · 17153222

Helping consumers select PHRs.

AHIMA Personal Health Record Practice Council·Jill Burrington-Brown·Deresa Claybrook·Leslie Fox·Kevin Gould·Lois Hall·Kathleen Hayman·Ellen Jacobs·Dee Lang·LaVonne LaMoureaux·Beth Malchetske·John Morgan·Keith Olenik·Ronald Peterson·Lawrence Williams·Julie Wolter·Beth Zallar·David Sweet
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Choice BehaviorCommunity ParticipationHumansMedical Record AdministratorsMedical RecordsUnited StatesJournal Article

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AHIMA Personal Health Record Practice Council, Jill Burrington-Brown, Deresa Claybrook, Leslie Fox, Kevin Gould, Lois Hall, Kathleen Hayman, Ellen Jacobs, Dee Lang, LaVonne LaMoureaux, Beth Malchetske, John Morgan, Keith Olenik, Ronald Peterson, Lawrence Williams, Julie Wolter, Beth Zallar, David Sweet. Helping consumers select PHRs.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17153222/

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