Surrogacy: the case for a conventional approach.

Abstract

Legislation for the reproductive technologies made a false beginning when initial legislation chose to obscure the separation of genetic and social/legal parenthood resulting from the use of donor sperm and ova. This initial falsehood is compounding the difficulties of later attempts to deal with more complex issues. The NSW Law Reform Commission's arguments and recommendations with regard to surrogacy illustrate this problem. It is argued that legislation should work from precedent in matters of recognition and transfer of parenthood, and that the social ramifications of the new technologies should be identified as far as possible within existing social determinations. The nature of surrogacy and required legislation is explored in this context, and it is argued that surrogacy should be subject to essentially the same regulation as adoption, thus debarring commercialization but without legislative intervention into the area of private reproductive behaviour. It is suggested that such an approach will effectually discourage surrogacy as it provides no sureties for the 'commissioning' couple.