Games that teach: a practical approach.

B J Wolkenheim; J Westdorp

PubMed · 2299411

Games that teach: a practical approach.

Abstract

The response of the staff to the safety game has been exceptional. "I never realized that safety review could be fun," is a common comment. Preparation time for the game did take longer than for a traditional lecture, but new material can be used when the game is used again. Motivating staff to learn and/or review materials such as those involved in safety procedures often is difficult. Playing our safety game is motivating because it is perceived as fun and informal. Involvement in the game offers the opportunity for immediate application of knowledge. Games are effective teaching methods for these reasons; they also provide feedback to learners and allow evaluation of learning as well.

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Game Theory Games, Experimental Humans Learning Motivation Nursing Staff Reinforcement, Psychology Journal Article

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B J Wolkenheim, J Westdorp. Games that teach: a practical approach.. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/2299411/

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