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What did Eugen Bleuler really say?

M Menuck
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Abstract

Bleuler's 1911 monograph on schizophrenia is an attempt to redefine Kraepelin's dementia praecox making use of contemporaneous somatogenic and psychogenic theories of illness, and is best appreciated in its proper historical context. Currently there is confusion about Bleuler's concept of schizophrenia, arising in part from inherent textual difficulties and compounded by inaccurate representations of his account. This conceptual confusion may be reflected in diagnostic uncertainty today, and in the renewed interest in nosology and diagnostic rigor that characterizes much of the literature on schizophrenia at the present time.

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History, 18th CenturyHistory, 19th CenturyHistory, 20th CenturyHumansSchizophreniaSwitzerlandBiographyHistorical ArticleJournal Article

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M Menuck. 1979. What did Eugen Bleuler really say?. https://doi.org/10.1177/070674377902400209

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