PubMed · 5366407
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E R Harcum. 1969. Cognitive anchoring of different errors in continuous serial learning.. https://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1969.25.1.79
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The distinction between rule-based and similarity-based processes in cognition is of fundamental importance for cognitive science, and has been the focus of a large body of empirical research. However, intuitive uses of the distinction are subject to theoretical difficulties and their relation to empirical evidence is not clear. We propose a 'core' distinction between rule- and similarity-based processes, in terms of the way representations of stored information are 'matched' with the representation of a novel item. This explication captures the intuitively clear-cut cases of processes of each type, and resolves apparent problems with the rule/similarity distinction. Moreover, it provides a clear target for assessing the psychological and AI literatures. We show that many lines of psychological evidence are less conclusive than sometimes assumed, but suggest that converging lines of evidence may be persuasive. We then argue that the AI literature suggests that approaches which combine rules and similarity are an important new focus for empirical work.
For 21 days, 123 undergraduates provided measures of their self-esteem, anxiety, causal uncertainty, perceived control over outcomes, and the three constructs comprising A. T. Beck's (1972) cognitive triad. Factor analyses of measures of the mean level and day-to-day instability of these constructs produced 2 factors, level of well-being and day-to-day instability of well-being. Participants also provided 4 measures of risk for depression over 2 1/2 months. For participants who were not at risk for depression, level of day-to-day well-being was negatively related to risk for depression, and this effect was not moderated by day-to-day instability. In contrast, for participants who were classified as at-risk for depression, day-to-day instability of well-being moderated the strength of the negative relationship between level of well-being and risk for depression. The relationship between level of well-being and depression was stronger for participants who were more unstable.