PubMed · 5913588
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M Natanson. 1966. Is intentionality intelligible without causality?. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/5913588/
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Thesis: Since Socrates, western philosophy has been concerned with the study of humankind, with a strong emphasis on how we ought to live and why. Philosophy, in its multiple forms and expressions, has enabled many to pursue their lives with greater depth, richness, and variety; yet it can also act as a therapeutic method for the achievement of a healthier life. Asking and answering philosophical questions such as 'How best ought I live?', 'What is the meaning of my life in relation to the whole?', 'Why should I live?', 'What constitutes a healthy life?' can act as therapeutic entryways, not only within the parameters of one's own mind or in a university classroom, but also within a health care/therapy context. Philosophy, both as subject and method, is a powerful, largely unrecognized, therapeutic instrument for social medicine, an instrument whose application in various health care settings could benefit those--patient and staff--in need of consolation and support when they need it most.
This paper argues that Heidegger's phenomenology does not have the methodological implications usually ascribed to it in nursing literature. The Heidegger of Being and Time is not in any sense antagonistic to science, nor does he think that everydayness is more authentic, more genuine, than scientific enquiry or theoretical cognition. It is true that social science must rest on interpretive foundations, acknowledging the self-interpreting nature of human beings, but it does not follow from this that hermeneutics exhausts all the possibilities. Positivist approaches to social science are certainly inconsistent with Heidegger's ontology, but realist approaches are not and structuration theory, in particular, can be seen as a sociological translation of his ideas. Social enquiry in nursing is not therefore confined to studies of lived experience. Indeed, lived experience research constitutes not a realization, but rather a betrayal, of Heidegger's phenomenology, being thoroughly Cartesian in spirit.
This paper describes a method of clinical supervision that engages a Macmillan home care nurse in an existential-phenomenological exchange. A synthesis of Egan's method of problem management and phenomenological interviewing, is offered as an approach to clinical supervision considered appropriate for palliative care nursing. Through a case study approach the author affords glimpses into the life world of palliative care nursing. It is suggested that conflicts experienced in the field both manifest themselves in the supervisory encounter and parallel the nurse's and supervisor's own existential struggles. The discussion as such throws light on what is, frequently, the heart rending nature of palliative care nurses' chosen area of work and illuminates the mutual profundity of the experience of palliative care.