PubMed · 6433790
The source did not provide an abstract. Follow the original record for more information.
Explore connections, maps & timelines
1984. DRG Update.. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0001-2092(07)69435-6
Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.
KEEP EXPLORING
This paper is a review of recent trends in United States expenditures on research and development (R&D). Real expenditures by both the government and the private sector increased rapidly between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, and have since leveled off. This is true of both overall expenditures and expenditures on basic research, as well as funding of academic research. Preliminary estimates indicate that about $170 billion was spent on R&D in the United States in 1995, with approximately 60% of that funding coming from the private sector and about 35% from the federal government. In comparison to other countries, we have historically spent more on R&D relative to our economy than other advanced economies, but this advantage appears to be disappearing. If defense-related R&D is excluded, our expenditures relative to the size of the economy are considerably smaller than those of other similar economies.
In previous research, we have found a steep learning curve in the production of semiconductors. We estimated that most production knowledge remains internal to the firm, but that a significant fraction "spills over" to other firms. The existence of such spillovers may justify government actions to stimulate research on semiconductor manufacturing technology. The fact that not all production knowledge spills over, meanwhile, creates opportunities for firms to form joint ventures and slide down their learning curves more efficiently. With these considerations in mind, in 1987 14 leading U.S. semiconductor producers, with the assistance of the U.S. government in the form of $100 million in annual subsidies, formed a research and development (R&D) consortium called Sematech. In previous research, we estimated that Sematech has induced its member firms to lower their R&D spending. This may reflect more sharing and less duplication of research, i.e., more research being done with each R&D dollar. If this is the case, then Sematech members may wish to replace any funding withdrawn by the U.S. government. This in turn would imply that the U.S. government's contributions to Sematech do not induce more semiconductor research than would otherwise occur.
The intellectual property laws in the United States provide the owners of intellectual property with discretion to license the right to use that property or to make or sell products that embody the intellectual property. However, the antitrust laws constrain the use of property, including intellectual property, by a firm with market power and may place limitations on the licensing of intellectual property. This paper focuses on one aspect of antitrust law, the so-called "essential facilities doctrine," which may impose a duty upon firms controlling an "essential facility" to make that facility available to their rivals. In the intellectual property context, an obligation to make property available is equivalent to a requirement for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing may embrace the requirement that the owner of software permit access to the underlying code so that others can develop compatible application programs. Compulsory licensing may undermine incentives for research and development by reducing the value of an innovation to the inventor. This paper shows that compulsory licensing also may reduce economic efficiency in the short run by facilitating the entry of inefficient producers and by promoting licensing arrangements that result in higher prices.