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PubMed · 8039378

Concepts: a potboiler.

J Fodor
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Abstract

An informal, but revisionist, discussion of the role that the concept of a concept plays in recent theories of the cognitive mind. It is argued that the practically universal assumption that concepts are (at least partially) individuated by their roles in inferences is probably mistaken. A revival of conceptual atomism appears to be the indicated alternative.

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BehaviorismCognitionConcept FormationHumansPsycholinguisticsPsychological TheorySemanticsJournal Article

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J Fodor. Concepts: a potboiler.. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(94)90023-x

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