PubMed · 9053660
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B Järhult, J Järhult. 1997-01-29. [An executive without mandate].. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9053660/
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The extent to which the moral hazard caused by health insurance represents economic inefficiency has been the subject of much debate. This paper incorporates health status in a model of moral hazard, and finds that seriously ill patients are likely to exhibit greater moral hazard than healthier patients but the proportion of moral hazard that is inefficient declines with the severity of illness. Because of these competing tendencies, the cost of resource misallocation is parabolic in the severity of illness. The effect of the consumer's initial wealth endowment is also considered.
To improve ethanol production in Saccharomyces cerevisiae, two yeast strains were constructed. In the mutant KAM-3, the FPS1 gene, which encodes a channel protein responsible for glycerol export, was deleted. The mutant KAM-11 had the GLT1 gene (encoding glutamate synthase) placed under the PGK1 promoter while having the FPS1 deletion. Growth rate and biomass concentration remained virtually unchanged with the mutant KAM-11, compared to that of the parent. Over-expression of GLT1 by the PGK1 promoter along with FPS1 deletion resulted in a 14% higher ethanol production and a 30% lower glycerol formation compared to the parental strain under anaerobic fermentation conditions. Furthermore, acetate and pyruvic acid formation was also reduced in order for cells to maintain redox balance.